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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF BEING A CITIZEN;
WOMEN AND CITIZENSHIP IN RIO DE JANEIRO
MAY 2002
JOANNA SHEA WHEELER, B.S. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Srirupa Roy
Citizenship has traditionally been defined in the context of the nation-state
as a set of individual rights and responsibilities, equal for all members of the
society. But traditional democratic citizenship has been unsuccessful, for some,
in alleviating human misery and creating democratic societies. The slippages of
traditional citizenship are due to 1) its foundation on the premises of liberalism
and the nation-state, especially the notion of political participation in a universal
public sphere and 2) the increasing fragmentation of the authority of the nation-
state as the sole source of authenticity for citizenship. But even as traditional
definitions of citizenship and rights have failed and are unraveling, new forms of
citizenship are articulated, expanded, and foreclosed in new contexts and by a
variety of groups—especially in global cities. Cities are an important context for
the formation of citizenship because although cities most strongly embody the
failures of national citizenship, cities are also the most prominent site where new
rights and new forms of citizenship are disputed. Because citizenship in the
nation-state is unraveling, but more importantly because traditional citizenship is
failing; it is necessary to examine citizenship outside the traditional conceptions
of democratic citizenship in the nation-state. So this study examines citizenship
V
for a group historically excluded from citizenship (women) in the context of a
global city (Rio de Janeiro). Specifically, this study will examine citizenship 1
)
beyond the public/private divide in terms of the intersection of women’s daily life
and citizenship (rather in terms of universal abstractions), 2) as a process of
belonging and achieving access to the city (rather than as a list of rights or
political parties), and 3) as the casting of citizens with certain roles and identities,
excluding and conflicting with other roles and identities (rather than citizen as a
neutral and universal category). This analysis of citizenship (in response to the
failures of traditional democratic citizenship) creates a conception of
contextualized citizenship that responds to the growing divide between formal
and substantive citizenship in the nation-state.
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CHAPTER I
THE FAILINGS OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
A. Introduction
Sebastiana Tiana Rosaria Jesus Souza, forty-six, lives in a crumbling
and violent housing project in the Zona Norte (North Zone) of the Rio de Janeiro
that was built in the 1970’s to house the dislocated residents of Catacumba—
a
favela (squatter settlement) demolished by Brazil’s military dictatorship. She and
her second husband (both Afro-brazilians) share their two-bedroom apartment
with Tiana’s daughter, son, and granddaughter. Tiana financially supports the
household, while takes the responsibility for raising her children and
grandchildren, and finding work for her daughter and herself.
In the more than ten years since Tiana migrated to Rio de Janeiro from
Brazil’s interior, she has worked as a receptionist, a maid, a cook, a hair dresser,
a baby sitter, and most recently as a researcher on urban poverty. Since she
arrived in Rio de Janeiro, she has managed to establish a moderately successful
catering business for wealthy and middle-class clients from her contacts working
as a maid.
Tiana attended school intermittently until she was twenty-one—and only
completed the first year of high school. She has since taken government-
sponsored courses in English, information technology, and research training—all
to get access to better jobs. Nonetheless, she has been unable to find formal
employment in Rio de Janeiro.
1
While Tiana moves across social and racial boundaries regularly, she
does not feel that she is a citizen of Rio de Janeiro. She says that the “lack of
dignity’ and “the way people treat you—as if you weren’t even human,” on a daily
basis, even more than the deteriorating living conditions in the housing project
and her lack of access to better jobs, are the signs that she is still not a full
citizen of Rio de Janeiro.
National citizenship has little meaning in terms of liana’s life. The drastic
regime changes in Brazil from dictatorship to democracy have had little to no
impact on her life: “Brazil was better off under a dictatorship because at least
things worked, and I didn’t have to worry about drug traffickers and their stray
bullets.”
Tiana’s case is a call to consider citizenship contextualized spatially in the
city and in terms of her quotidian experiences. This case raises several
important questions for citizenship and political science. First, the analytical tools
of political science that focus on the formal requirements and conditions for
citizenship have little purchase in reference to Tiana’s story. Brazil’s relatively
recent democracy, implemented in terms of government institutions, a
democratic constitution, and free and fair elections has not translated into
substantive, meaningful citizenship for Tiana. The explanation for this alienation
lies in the contextualization of her citizenship in the city of Rio de Janeiro.
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Tiana s story shows how the city embodies contrasting citizenships. The
city is not an open political and social landscape where opportunity and access to
the city s resources are freely available. She experiences the failure of national
citizenship in terms of her life in the city of Rio de Janeiro—where citizenship is
fragmented along spatial, socio-economic, racial, and gender lines. liana’s
citizenship is very different from that of the women she cooks and cleans for.
Citizenship is failing for Tiana both in terms of her access to the city’s resources
and in terms of meaning, to the extent that she sees no real difference between
democracy and dictatorship in her life.
Tiana’s example is only one of many examples of the failures of national
citizenship. In most of the world, women did not have even nominal citizenship
(let alone practiced citizenship) until the twentieth century (Walby 1994). In the
United States, blacks were nominally citizens only from 1864 onwards. But
practical citizenship for blacks only began in the 1960’s with the civil rights
movement. Immigrants and migrants are often left out of the citizenship story
(Castels and Davidson 2000). Clearly national citizenship has not been and is
not equal for all. National citizenship has failed in two respects. First, there is a
serious divide between formal and substantive citizenship. Although national
citizenship is formally equal for all members of the nation-state (albeit a fairly
recent development), citizenship has only been valid for some in practice. That
is, citizenship (for some) has not translated into concrete benefits such as access
to the society’s resources (from housing to the job market). This lack of access
prohibits formal citizenship (in the form of certain rights and responsibilities) from
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having real meaning, and works to preclude the political participation of excluded
groups. Second, the traditional definition of national citizenship has erased and
excluded certain groups while privileging others. As a result, the traditional
notion of citizenship has been emptied of meaning for those it does not include.
Because citizenship in the nation-state is based on the idea of equality and the
maintenance of a divide between public political participation and the private,
national citizenship erases the importance of particular, every day
experiences—in effect erasing certain types of citizens. “Citizenship” and "citizen"
are not neutral, universal categories. In a talk on women and human rights at the
January 2002 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Susan Chiarotti, a
feminist scholar from Argentina argued: “Every right has a subject—and that
subject is a man—white, rich, from the North. And an ethnocentrically-defined
right can never be implemented effectively” (translation mine). Similarly, citizen
is not a truly universal category even within a state
—
‘citizen’ has not included
certain people: women, ethnic and racial minorities (or in some cases
majorities), gays, lesbians, indigenous groups, migrants, asylum seekers, etc.
Prior to an analysis of the failings of citizenship, it is important to situate
citizenship in relation to the state, the nation, and liberalism. First, while
citizenship’s genealogy begins with the Athenian model in Ancient Greece,
citizenship has been late in arriving in the state. The state, as a form of political
organization, emerged from European feudal and authoritarian tradition very
alien to citizenship. In fact, citizenship only became important in the context of
the state when revolutions forced the state to accommodate liberal ideology.
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Beginning with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and continuing with the French
and American Revolutions, European states began to accept accountability to
their constituents for their rule. National citizenship is the result of the state’s
acquiescence to liberalism: “in the debate on the rights of man and the citizen at
the time of the French Revolution...we see with absolute clarity that the modern
theory of the citizen in the nation-state insists on the citizens’ rights against the
state...’’(Castels and Davidson 2000: 36).
So liberalism, with its focus on the individual, the divide between public
and private, and universalism, was both the catalyst for the establishment of
citizenship in the state and also determinant in the character of national
citizenship. The citizen and citizenship, in liberal terms, are defined in terms of
rights against the state for all legitimate members of the state. Subsequently,
Marxist and socialist critiques of liberalism and national citizenship have
expanded the narrower liberal version of citizenship. The welfare state is based
on the Marxist claim that political participation in the liberal sense is not possible
without access to a certain level of education, employment, etc. (see Chapter 2,
Castels and Davidson 2000).
The nation and nationalism add an additional element to this story of
citizenship in the nation-state. Ernst Gellner defines nationalism as a “theory of
political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across
political ones’’(Gellner 1983:1). Therefore a nation-state would be the
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juxtaposition of nation (a cultural boundary) and state (a political boundary). And
national citizenship implies not only citizenship in the state, but also the
demarcation of citizens by nation.
Although citizenship has been defined in different ways, the influence of
liberal ideology has shaped national citizenship in the joining between nation,
state, and citizenship. The welfare state is an attempt to assure the liberal form
of political participation and citizenship through guarantees for certain conditions,
rather than challenge the liberal premises, themselves. This study addresses
national citizenship and its failures at the nexus between liberalism and the
nation-state.
This study argues that the slippages of national citizenship are due to 1
)
its foundation on the premises of liberalism in the nation-state, especially the
notion of political participation in a universal public sphere, and 2) the increasing
fragmentation of the authority of the nation-state as the sole source of
authenticity for citizenship. Historically, the nation-state and liberal conceptions
of the citizenship have been closely connected. National citizenship, because of
this connection, relies strongly on certain tenets of liberalism: the divide between
public and private that separates legitimate political participation in the public
realm from the private; the individual as the recipient of rights and primary social
actor; and, the idea of universalism where such rights and citizenship can be
equal for all. This particular set of ideas informs the definition of national
citizenship, and excludes important factors such as identity, difference, gender,
and the family from informing citizenship. The second factor contributing to the
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failures of national citizenship is the erosion of the authority of the nation-state. A
series offerees, from globalizing flows of capital, information, people, disease,
and technology, to the rise of global movements for human rights and the
formation of new groups and communities around particular identities and
differences has weakened the authority of the nation-state. In consequence, the
contexts and meanings of citizenship are shifting to include new sites for
citizenship, such as the city or the world.
But even as traditional definitions of citizenship and rights have failed and
are unraveling, new forms of citizenship are articulated, expanded, and
foreclosed in new contexts and by a variety of groups—especially in global cities.
Global cities are large cities that are particularly influenced by globalizing labor
and capital markets, information, technology, and social movements (see Sassen
1991 and 2000). Global cities are a unique context for the formation of
citizenship because although cities most strongly embody the failures of national
citizenship, cities are also the most prominent site where new rights and new
forms of citizenship are disputed. In global cities the failures of national
citizenship are starkly evident. In Rio de Janeiro, Latin America’s biggest
squatter settlement overlooks the city’s richest neighborhood. The economic
inequality is striking between these two communities, not to mention the
difference in public security, access to urban services, level of education, etc.
Urban space is a place where the contradictions of citizenship exist side by side.
But it is also a place where new forms of rights and conceptions are articulated
and disputed. Global cities represent the confluence of many different
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people immigrants, migrants, different races, religions, classes, sexualities etc.
In the space of the global city, these groups struggle to redefine citizenship and
rights.
Because citizenship in the nation-state is unraveling, but more importantly
because traditional citizenship is failing; it is necessary to examine citizenship
outside the traditional conceptions of democratic citizenship in the nation-state.
So this study examines citizenship for a group historically excluded from
citizenship (women) in the context of a global city (Rio de Janeiro). The global
city is a unique location to examine citizenship because while it embodies the
contradictions of citizenship, it is also the space where new forms of citizenship
are disputed. This study considers the divisions of citizenship in the city 1)
spatially, 2) along socio-economic divisions, and 3) in terms of gender and race.
These cleavages in citizenship in Rio de Janeiro provide the context for an
analysis of a specific group within the city. This analysis of the context of
citizenship in Rio de Janeiro is a necessary backdrop to examining how
citizenship works and fails for group. Next, this study will examine citizenship for
women in Rio de Janeiro 1 ) beyond the public/private divide in terms of the
intersection of women’s daily life and citizenship (rather in terms of universal
abstractions), 2) as a process of belonging and achieving access to the city
(rather than as a list of rights or public political participation), and 3) as the
casting of citizens with certain roles and identities, excluding and conflicting with
other roles and identities (rather than citizen as a neutral and universal category).
Evaluating citizenship in a context other than the nation-state, and for a group
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that does not enjoy full citizenship will provide some insights into the failures of
citizenship in the nation-state. That is, the exclusions of national citizenship are
experienced and embodied in particular contexts for particular groups—and the
global city highlights these exclusions. This methodology focuses attention on
areas normally excluded from traditional scholarship on citizenship. For
example, there has been extensive work done on the role of social movements
and activists in re-formulating citizenship (see Alvarez et. al. 1998). In contrast,
this study focuses on the relationship between the quotidian of women’s
experiences and citizenship.
This study brings a feminist methodology and analysis to bear on an
important issue in international politics. In the case of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro,
the failures of citizenship and democracy have serious implications. And Brazil
and Rio de Janeiro are not alone—national citizenship is cracked and
fragmented in a hundred places. The story of citizenship does not explain why
certain groups and segments of society (both international and national) are
excluded, even undermined by citizenship. The best place to understand these
problems is in a particular context with a particular citizenship. Moving the
location of citizenship from the generalized to a specific context is a necessary
step in understanding citizenship’s failures. It is the fragmentation of citizenship
and its failures to provide equal citizenship for all that necessitates studying
citizenship at the level of the particular. How has the story of an equal citizenship
for all in the nation-state come apart? Do these cracks in the smooth surface of
democratic national citizenship impeach its very validity; or, do new contexts and
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meanings for citizenship offer a new direction for citizenship? And what can an
understanding of a particular citizenship in a particular context offer to these
questions about citizenship in the nation-state? In the process of examining the
dynamics of national citizenship’s failures in the context of the city, this study also
considers the spaces where new articulations of citizenship are contested.
As national citizenship is increasingly eroded and fragmented, the failings of this
form of citizenship to address human misery call into question its very. And as
national political authority fragments, new kinds of political community are
claiming allegiances (such as the city). So the space where national citizenship
is failing is where these new forms of citizenship are articulated.
B. National Citizenship
National citizenship is supposed to be equal for all members of the nation-
state. But in practice citizenship is not that simple. The main evidence that
citizenship in the nation-state is not all that it claims to be is the failures of that
citizenship. That state, in other words, is not living up to its commitments. In
examining national citizenship and its failures, it is first important to discuss the
way that national citizenship has traditionally been defined. The definition of
national citizenship points to one of the major failures of national citizenship: the
divide between formal and substantive citizenship. A second major failing of
national citizenship is that, because it evokes a particular citizen and particular
citizenship, it excludes certain roles and identities while privileging others. This
unevenness empties national citizenship of meaning for those outside the
purportedly universal ‘citizen’ category.
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The causes of these failings are that 1) national citizenship has been
connected to particular ideological aspects of liberalism and the nation-state
including universalism, the public/private divide, and individualism; and 2) the
nation-state as the sole source of authentic citizenship has been eroded by both
globalization and identity politics, among other factors.
1. Definitions
There are two main types of definitions of citizenship. First are traditional
definitions that characterize citizenship through membership in a political
community (specifically the nation-state) with equal individual rights and
responsibilities (Marshall 1950, Mann 1987, van Steenbergen in Hannagan
1999). National citizenship is “first an assertion of popular will, and then a list of
legal rights that are regarded as inherent in all people as equals”(Alastair and
Davidson 2000: 36). Historically this definition of citizenship is linked to the rise
of the nation-state and democracy via political struggles in Europe and the then-
colonies in North America in the late 1700’s. Ideologically, this definition of
citizenship draws on both liberal and communitarian political theorists including
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant (see Altastair and Davidson 2000, chapter
1 and Isen 2000, introduction). T.H. Marshall defines citizenship as composed of
three elements: civil, political, and social. Each element is comprised of certain
rights and the institutions (of the state) that guarantee those rights (Marshall
1 950: 1 0-1 1 ). Particular societies stress differently individual elements of this
citizenship. For example, civil and political rights are more central in the United
States, while in Europe social rights are most important. There are two primary
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arguments for the theoretical sources of these rights as a citizen. The liberal
argument claims that all members of a state are rational individuals with an
independent capacity for morality and therefore merit the same rights (Kant 1991,
Rawls 1971). In the liberal view, our equality guarantees us the same rights. The
communitarian argument claims that rights are derived from the relationship
between the members of a community and its government. That is, as members
of a community, we cede certain amounts of individual sovereignty to our
collective government. Our collective government is obligated to protect us
according the rights that we establish as part of a particular community
(Rousseau 1973, Taylor 1994). In the communitarian argument, the “cohesive
and just functioning of the society” is the primary concern. And citizenship and
rights are connected to a cohesive and just functioning society (see Isen 2000,
4
—5). In both the liberal and the communitarian arguments, rights are integral to
participation in the state. Further, citizenship and its companion rights are
accorded by a particular political organization: the nation-state. Despite some
important references to cosmopolitanism (particularly in Kant) it is clear that
citizenship, as defined by a particular group of rights and obligations, is closely
linked to the nation-state as a political organization. This traditional definition of
national democratic citizenship relies on the notion of equal and universal rights
for all individuals in the polity.
A second set of definitions of citizenship focuses on the processes
involved in participating or belonging to a (political) community. Engin Isen
argues that it is necessary but not sufficient to define citizenship as a list of
12
specific rights. Citizenship “must also be defined as a social process through
which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing
rights (Isen 5). Uma Narayan, proposing a feminist re-thinking of citizenship,
argues that citizenship refers “to the relationship that those who inhabit a nation
have to the state, and the various aspect of collective national life”(Narayan 48).
She argues that citizenship should be considered as a “status that connotes
social standing and dignity,” an “active participation in civic and political life," and
also as sense of nationality (citizenship-as-nationality) (Narayan 1991: 48).
Narayan argues that citizenship be a process of belonging in the sense that it
has meaning within the political community. Habermas proposes a citizenship
that results from a two-way process of interaction between the governed and the
government (deliberative democracy) (Habermas in Hannagan 1999: 32). These
arguments place the process of belonging or participating in a political
community at the forefront of the definition of citizenship. Defining citizenship as
a process expands the traditional definition of citizenship as a list of rights in
several ways. First, if citizenship is a process of participation and belonging,
than the actual social and economic situation of a citizen becomes important in
facilitating political participation. The issue of economic and social rights (such
as the right to adequate food and housing, employment, etc.) has been the
subject of debate between different rights-based traditions (see Shue 1996).
However, defining citizenship as a process of belonging requires ensuring a
certain level of access to the economic and social resources of the state.
Second, defining citizenship as a process of belonging and participation creates
13
the opportunity to consider various forms of political organization (beyond the
nation-state) as the reference for citizenship. That is, it is possible to talk about
being a citizen of a region, a city, or a global community. To the extent that
citizenship is defined as a list of rights guaranteed by the nation-state for all
individuals, it is difficult to account for other sources of citizenship. However,
defining citizenship as a process opens the space for various levels of citizenship
including the local, regional, and global.
What are the implications of this divergence in definitions of citizenship?
The first set of definitions characterizes citizenship by the presence or absence
of specific rights or duties within a given political system/society. The second set
characterizes citizenship through a process of belonging/having access to the
political system/society. These definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
For example, it is possible that certain political and civil rights could facilitate
access to the political system (such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
etc.) and other rights could facilitate a process of belonging (such as the freedom
of religion, the right to education, etc.). However, the nature of the definition of
citizenship determines where to look to see if citizenship is working. In the case
of the first definition, citizenship is considered successful if a government exists
that acknowledges the itinerant rights required for citizenship—‘free and fair’
elections, a bill of rights, a contract in the Rousseauian sense, something that
guarantees specific status for all citizens. In the case of the second definition, it
is necessary to look somewhere else entirely. It is impossible to assess
citizenship as a process of belonging or access without considering citizenship in
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a particular context. If citizenship is to have meaning it has to work on the level
of daily life in concrete terms of access to the city, to the community, to the job
market, to political influence, to education, etc. The nature of definition of
traditional democratic national citizenship has erased certain things from
citizenship—primarily the every day life experiences and particular contexts of
people’s lives."' In order to understand how the definition of national citizenship
has privileged certain groups and excluded others, it is necessary to more closely
examine the relationship between the nation-state and national citizenship. In
Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro in particular, formal citizenship in the form of rights
guaranteed in a constitution, has not been sufficient to create an equal
citizenship in practice.
2. Problems
That is, this divergence in definitions points to a troubling problem in
citizenship; the disconnect between formal and substantive citizenship. Defining
citizenship as belonging or having access also is a way of responding to the
glaring differences between formal and substantive citizenship not addressed by
formal definitions of citizenship in the nation-state. Formally all citizens in the
nation-state have equal rights to political participation. But in practice not all
citizens enjoy the same degree of citizenship in terms of inclusion in the political
process and access to the state’s resources. Citizenship embodies a
' Clearly national citizenship also excludes other groups by actually withholding citizenship or
enforcing certain features of national identity (like language, dress, religion, etc.); illegal
immigrants, slaves, asylum seekers, ethnic minorities, etc (see Castels and Davidson 2000).
However, the focus of this study is how national citizenship works to exclude those who are
ostensibly part of the national community.
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contradiction in that it formally encourages the participation of all citizens equally
while simultaneously participation is limited because of substantive differences.
Elizabeth Jelin calls this contradiction in citizenship “a discourse of participation
and a non-discourse of economic exclusion”(Jelin 1 998: 408). For as much as
formal citizenship is based on equality, in practice a range of socio-economic
factors can limit inclusion as a citizen. In the introduction to Cities and
Citizenship (1999), James Holston and Arjun Appadurai discuss the relationships
between formal and substantive citizenship in making an argument for
considering the city as a site for citizenship:^
...[MJuch of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following
problem: although in theory full access to rights depends on
membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship
substantively is often independent of its formal status. In other
words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship.
That it is not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who have
formal membership in the state but who are excluded in fact or law
from enjoying the rights of citizenship and participating effectively in
its organization. This condition also applies to citizens of all
classes who find that their preferences for a desirable or proper
form of life—^for example with regard to sexual or religious
practices—are not adequately embodied in the national-public
sphere of rights even through the communities in which they live
overwhelmingly approve them. Moreover, it is now evident that a
condition of formal membership without much substantive
citizenship characterizes many of the societies that have
experienced recent transitions to democracy and market capitalism
in Latin America... (4).
^ Holtson and Appadurai also argue that those not formally citizens (such as highly educated
legal immigrants) can at times gain access to the society’s resources. This point reinforces the
argument above that citizenship and ‘citizen’ are not ‘living up to their claims’ in that citizenship
privileges some while excluding others.
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Holston and Appadurai go on to argue that the disjuncture between formal and
substantive citizenship has contributed to an undermining of the meaning of
citizenship in the nation-state. Central to the traditional conception of democracy
is the notion of equality—all citizens are equal. Yet the major divide between
substantive and formal citizenship shows that this is clearly not the case.
Holston and Appadurai also raise a second problem with the divide
between formal and substantive citizenship. National citizenship has also failed
in that, both historically and actually, certain groups have been excluded from
formal and/or substantive citizenship. While national citizenship, in theory, is
universal and equal for all members of the nation-state, in practice this is clearly
not the case. The list of those excluded (both historically and actually) from the
benefits of citizenship is long: the poor, women, indigenous groups, racial and
ethnic minorities, gays, migrants, children, etc. In other words, the overly
obvious fact that, despite claims to universality, citizenship has not been equal
for all is indicative of a general confusion surrounding the meaning and validity of
citizenship. Not only have certain people not enjoyed practiced citizenship, but
also formal citizenship, as traditionally defined, has privileged certain other
groups, such as the political and economic elite, white men, and certain
immigrant groups. The “neutral category ‘citizen’ often is a false universalization
of the interests of the powerful...’’(Marso 1998). That is, traditional national
democratic citizenship, as defined by a list of individual and universal rights, has
not been power-neutral. Certain groups have benefited, while others have been
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excluded. This exclusion and erasure of certain identities from citizenship
bankrupts citizenship of its meaning in terms of those on the outside of its
meaning.
3. Causes
If the primary failures of national citizenship are the increasing gap
between formal and substantive citizenship, and the privileging of certain groups
over others leading to a bankruptcy of meaning, what are the main reasons for
these failures? First, the failure of traditional national citizenship is related to the
intimate connection between the political ideology of the nation-state and national
citizenship. Second, national citizenship has failed because the nation-state, as
the main source of authenticity and authority for citizenship, has been eroded.
The erosion of the authority of the nation-state has coincided with the rise in
importance of new sources of citizenship (such as the global human rights
movement).
Some scholars suggest that citizenship cannot exist without the nation-
state; “the nation-state, although weakened by internal and external
contradictions, is still the only political unit capable of maintaining democratic
citizenship”(Castles and Davidson 2000: 15). At the very least a firm historical
connection between citizenship and the nation-state remains in their parallel
development during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Anderson 1983).
One possible explanation for the slippages of national citizenship could be that
national citizenship has not been adequately implemented. Charles Tilly and
others argue that it is possible to develop new forms and processes of
citizenship
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within the nation-state context through democratization (Tilly 1999). But the
connection between the nation-state and national citizenship is particularly
strong, and that connection has specific implications for the nature of national
citizenship. The context of the nation-state as the locus for national citizenship
has led to a particular definition of citizenship that erases and excludes certain
roles and identities and it is this erosion that has contributed to national
citizenship’s failures.
How have citizenship and the nation-state been connected? The nation-
state, as a very particular kind of political organization has been linked to a very
particular kind of citizenship. That citizenship, like the nation-state, has been
based on several central tenets: 1 ) the creation of a public sphere (as separate
from the private) as the legitimate sphere for political participation; 2)
individualism: and 3) universalism (particularly related to the rights discourse).
This connection has lead to a national citizenship defined in terms of universal
individual rights and political participation in the public sphere.
The creation of a public and private sphere and the boundary between the
two is also integral to Western political tradition in the nation-state and
citizenship. “The concept of citizenship depends upon the public; the term has
no significant meaning in private’’(Walby 1994). The public means space where
valid political participation takes place and the private means space where the
political does not enter. Civics and notions of political participation in the nation-
state are based on distinction between public and private (Elshtain in Narayan
1991, Beauregard and Bounds 2000, Minow and Shanley in Narayan 1991).
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Feminists challenge this division because it masks the subordination of women in
private from political debate and devalues the work and relationships of the
private in contrast with the public. In terms of citizenship, public processes are
privileged in informing citizenship: voting, participating in political parties and
electoral commissions, etc. Private processes, such as childcare, education,
marriage, and un-waged work are not ‘relevant’ to citizenship.
Another important tenant of the state is the notion that society is
composed of individuals—these individuals are necessarily rational and unitary,
and act according to their particular interests (Rawls 1 973). In terms of the
nation-state, the reduction of the world to individuals is essential to national
identity and the success of individual rights. In the process of consolidating the
nation-state as the dominant form of political organization in the West, “a single
national definition of self was added...to the particular differences that were
protected behind the notion of individual rights”(Castels and Davidson 2000:
213). Conceiving of the world as comprised of individuals is perhaps liberalism’s
greatest tunnel vision. By tunnel vision, I mean that liberalism focuses on a
particular vision of society that reduces difference and particular identities into
one generalized category of individual (citizen). That is, it is too complicated to
consider society as comprised of myriad connections and webs between people
with different identities who act ‘unpredictably’. Characterizing persons as
divorced from any context masks the web of relationships and identities that
connect people within and between societies. Further, liberalism’s tunnel vision
relegates aspects of difference (such as race, religion, gender, etc.) to the private
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sphere. This idealized characterization of persons as ‘individuals’ sterilizes them
from the messiness of contextualized life. Not only does liberalism’s notion of the
individual exclude certain identities and roles, it also advances particular
interests. A citizen of the nation-state; therefore, must also be a rational
individual acting according to interest (see Marso 1998 discussion). As such, in
the context of the nation-state and Western liberal tradition (including citizenship)
individuals are the recipients of rights, not groups or communities. The individual
as the primary social unit and political actor is essential to the nation-state, and is
also the sole bearer of national citizenship. But the notion of the individual is also
connected to another aspect of the ideology of the nation-state and national
citizenship: universalism.
Universalism, politically manifested in the nation-state in terms of ‘equal
rights for alf individuals, has been the corner stone of national citizenship. It is
the notion that society is comprised of individuals, undistinguished by context that
leads to universal claims based on equality:
“In liberal theory, the political sphere is one of universalism, while
cultural specificity is to be restricted to the private sphere. This
requires a separation between a person’s political rights and
obligations, and his or her membership of groups based on
ethnicity, religion, social class, or regional location. But this
conflicts with the reality of nation-state formation, in which
becoming a citizen has depended on membership in the dominant
cultural community’’(Castels and Davidson 2000: 124).
Seeing individuals with tunnel vision allows liberalism and the nation-state to
universalize rights and citizenship. Because all individuals are ostensibly equal,
with no politically meaningful differences, then citizenship and rights can be
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universally applicable. But historical context calls these claims to universalism
with in the nation-state into doubt. Sylvia Walby argues that “ 'citizenship’ is so
imbued with gender specific assumptions related to the public sphere and the
nexus of the market and state that it is necessarily only a partial rather than a
universalistic project”(Walby 1994: 379). Specifically, the problem is that the
universalized individual is not really universal, and the private sphere is not really
separate from the political. ‘Universal individual rights’ has historically meant
certain kinds of rights for certain individuals (i.e. civil and political rights for white,
European, propertied men). ‘‘The ideology of universal equality arises because
members of this referent group have never had to assert their difference, but only
their equality, to claim citizenship”(Holston and Appadurai 1999; 7). The major
divide between substantive and formal citizenship begs the question of whether
universal national citizenship exists. And in practice, political citizenship and
substantive rights have been weak for those outside the tunnel vision of
individuals: the poor, women, ethnic and racial minorities, gays and lesbians,
indigenous groups, etc. (Bulbeck 1999). Meanwhile, the notion of universal
citizenship has generalized the particular interests of the powerful.
The nation-state and national citizenship rely on the notion of the
universalized individual participating in the public sphere for coherence. But
these notions have not been free from very different implications in terms of
actual inclusion and citizenship. In fact, the tunnel vision ideology of the nation-
state and national citizenship works to exclude certain groups while privileging
others. Because this connection between national citizenship and the nation-
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state excludes so much, and national citizenship has failed for many on its own
terms, it is necessary to consider citizenship in new terms and contexts. De-
linking citizenship from the nation-state opens the definition of citizenship to
additional possibilities. Further divorcing citizenship from a particular political
context suggests the possibility of examining citizenship beyond the Western
liberal tradition.
A second factor contributing to the failure of national citizenship is the
erosion of the authority of the nation-state as the sole source of authentic
citizenship. A range of forces have lead to a decay in the authority of the nation-
state to guarantee citizenship for its members: globalizing flows of information,
technology, capital, ideas and people, identity politics, the growth of major urban
centers, information technology, global human rights discourse, etc. As the
authority of the nation-state has eroded, the nation-state as a unit of political
organization has been increasingly unable to ensure citizenship. “[T]he project of
a national society of citizens, especially liberalism’s twentieth-century vision,
appears increasingly exhausted and discredited”(Holston 1999: 2) The myth of
solitary national citizenship, like identity, has become fractured and multi-layered.
What factors have contributed to the weakening of citizenship in the nation-state?
There are many factors that can be divided roughly into two trends. First, the
increasingly global flows of everything from people to capital have generated new
contexts for political power, at the local, regional, and global levels. And second,
social movements and new political forces organized around specific identities
and cultural, religious, racial and other features have increasingly fragmented the
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meaning of ‘nation,’ and by extension the meaning of citizenship. In other words,
globalization and identity politics, from opposite directions, challenge the
authority of nation-state as the guarantor of citizenship. In a sense, citizenship in
the nation-state is caught between the two. The combined pressure of the
globalization of wealth and information, and [the] localization of identity and
legitimacy are calling into question “founding social institutions as important as
patriarchialism and the nation-state”(Castells 1998: 2). Globalization threatens
to expand the political contexts of citizenship to include the global, the regional,
and the local, while identity politics weaken the sources of citizenship at the level
of cohesive national identity. These processes clearly threaten the authority of
the nation-state. Eleven days after the terrorist attacks in the United States on
New York and Washington, DC, Edward Rothstein in a commentary in the New
York Times blamed post-modernism and post-colonialism for the “weakening
judgment” of the West and the United States against terrorism. “One can only
hope that finally, as the ramifications sinks in [sic], as it becomes clear how close
the attack came to undermining the political, military and financial authority of the
United States, the Western relativism of porno [postmodernism] and the
obsessive focus of poco [postcolonialsim] will be widely seen as ethically
perverse.” (Rothstein 2001). The paranoia expressed in the commentary is an
indication of the degree to which both globalization (in the form of forces that act
beyond the control of the nation-state) and identity politics (here called
postcolonialism) have weakened the authority of the nation-state and threaten
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traditional power structures.^ As these trends increasingly threaten the authority
of the nation-state, they also threaten the viability of national citizenship. So the
context for political power and political membership (citizenship) are shifting. As
these trends have weakened the authority of the nation-state, citizenship has
fractured into different meanings and contexts.
How has globalization weakened the authority of the nation-state? “The
main transformation [of globalization] concerns the crisis of the nation-state as a
sovereign entity, and the related crises of political democracy, as constructed in
the past two centuries. Since commands from the state cannot be fully enforced,
and since some of its fundamental promises, embodied in the welfare state,
cannot be kept, both its authority and legitimacy are called in to
question... .Globalization of capital, multi-lateralization of power institutions, and
decentralization of authority to regional and local governments induce a new
geometry of power....Social actors, and citizens at large, maximize changes of
representation of their interests and values by playing out strategies in the
networks of relationships between various institutions... "(Castells 1998: 377). So
globalization has dispersed political power across multiple contexts, as the state
is unable to control global pressures and trends. But, globalization has also
engendered “new patterns of global differentiation in which some states,
societies and social groups are becoming increasingly enmeshed with each
^ other scholars argue that globalization is not weakening the nation-state, but merely reshaping
its influence into new spaces (see Harvey 1999, and Held in Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999).
Certainly the construction of the power of the nation-state is shifting even as new spaces for state
control emerge and others are closed. Nonetheless, the city in general and the global city in
particular are examples of ways that globalization can weaken the control of the nation-state by
imbuing certain spaces with political authority. New levels of political community are
unquestionably gaining increasing validity—from the European Union to the global city.
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other, while others are becoming increasingly marginalized”(lsen 2000: 2). That
is, globalization is exacerbating the socio-economic stratification that has
foreclosed meaningful citizenship (Hardt and Negri 2000). Globalization has
simultaneously expanded the sources of citizenship to include transnational
organizations from the European Union to the United Nations and exaggerated
the marginality and lack of citizenship of those on the edges of this new more
enmeshed world (Alastair and Castles 2000).
If, as James Holston claims, “the nation-state is no longer a successful
arbiter of citizenship,” what are the new references for citizenship (Holston
1999:2)? Citizenship, beyond the nation-state, has significance in reference to
the world, the region, the city, and the neighborhood. In international politics, the
multiplying contexts for citizenship are evidenced by the rise in regional and
supra-state organizations that have weakened the absolute sovereignty of the
nation-state and represent new locations for citizenship and the struggle for new
rights (Sassen 2000, Isen 2000). This is not to imply that the nation-state is
withering away into a meaningless shell. Certainly the nation-state continues to
command considerable power—but the forces of globalization have ensured that
the nation-state is no longer the only legitimate source of political authority. The
nation-state now negotiates with other political units. For example, Holston
argues that the increasingly global flows of ideas, goods, capital, persons and
images is not obliterating the nation-state, but rather driving a deep wedge
between “national space and its urban centers”(Holston 1999: 3). The sum effect
of these pressures is that while the nation-state continues to exert power and
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control over its citizens, it is no longer the sole source of citizenship and cannot
command the sole allegiance of its citizens. Pippa Norris examines various
layers of identity through the World Values Survey (Norris 2000). The survey
attempts to assess the importance of different sources of identity {local/regional,
national, continental/world). Various regional, socio-economic, and generational
patterns emerge, but the most striking result is the relatively even pattern of
distribution between all the identity sources regardless of age, gender, nationality
etc."*
Partnered to the influence of globalization on the authority of the nation-
state and citizenship is the growing importance of identity politics. The term
‘identity politics’ represents the increasing recognition of the influence and power
of identity in the politics (not the sudden appearance of ‘identity’ as a feature of
post-modern life).® However as awareness of the role of identity in politics
grows, the sources for identity (and subsequent political action) are expanding
beyond the boundaries of national identity in the nation-state. The authority of
the nation-state is in large part related to the notion of a ‘nation’—some kind of
imagined community (Anderson 1983). Identity politics are weakening the
'' There is a higher level of national and local allegiance in the less economically developed
countries, with some exceptions. For example, the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe had
the highest level of regional allegiance.
®
I would like to avoid suggesting that identity is a new force in politics. Certainly identity has
always existed, but our ways of describing it have changed along with our recognition of its
political role. Also nation-formation and nationalism have always been about the
organization/suppression/exclusion of sub-national difference and identities. The difference in
current identity politics is that new social movements focused around particular identities are not
necessarily looking to be represented politically in national identity. In increasing cases, such as
the globalized movement for indigenous rights, the force behind identity politics is to redefine
the
political community in terms other than the nation-state.
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authority of the nation-state because they challenge the notion of nation by
articulating difference on particular terms (which may or may not be national).
Saskia Sassen argues that globalization is (partially) challenging the link between
territory and identity. This causes a loosening of identities from what have been
traditional sources of identity such as the nation or the village. This unmooring in
the process of identity formation engenders new notions of community of
membership and of entitlement”(Sassen 2000: 56). These new notions of
community and identity are leading to growing numbers of social and political
movements that are challenging the authority of the nation-state and the nature
of citizenship (see Alvarez et. al. 1998). Identity politics are fracturing national
identity into many pieces—ethnic and indigenous groups, women, gays and
lesbians, racial groups, regional identities. With that fracturing comes a
weakening of the state as the sole guarantor of rights and citizenship. As the
erosion of the authority of the nation-state creates other sites of authority for
citizenship, and other legitimate references for the citizen—the local or regional,
and the global or the cosmopolitan, the growing power of identity in politics
means that the space where those identities are articulated and disputed also
becomes more important. There are many who are excluded from national
citizenship (such as immigrants and refugees) or have less citizenship (such as
certain ethnic groups, women, and the poor) (Alastair and Davidson 2000,
Sassen 1991, Narayan 1991). Increasingly these groups are organizing around
the issue of citizenship and rights, and are struggling to recast citizenship and
rights. As different groups gain new political power and demand more
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citizenship, and more belonging (as in the current rise of Latino/Chicano political
power and citizenship in the US), these groups are renegotiating the degree and
level of their citizenship. The growing importance of identity politics accentuates
the fragmentation of the nation-state as the sole site for national citizenship; the
politics of belonging happen on multiple layers—spatially and socially. And in
large part, the process of identity formation and its articulation as a political
project happens in cities.
While both globalization and identity politics have challenged the authority
of the nation-state in specific ways, it is also important to note that it seems at
best unclear what the relationship between identity formation and globalization
will be. In some cases, particularly for those who live in the rich, powerful
elements of societies, globalization may represent a generalizing of identity
abstracted from place. But this is surely the minority. For the overwhelming
majority of poor and excluded (who have not enjoyed substantive citizenship),
the rapid changes brought about by globalization reinforce the need for identity
tied firmly to place and tradition. For example, in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and
low-income neighborhoods, the evangelico or fundamentalist Christian
movement has been growing exponentially. The converted that I interviewed
asserted that their church provides them with a community and a sense of
security in a city where uncertainty and violence are so prevalent. The drug
traffickers, with their arms trade with Colombia guerrilla and distribution networks
in the United States and Europe are the most obvious effect of globalization in
favelas—and in response, many favela residents turn to fundamentalist religion.
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On the other hand, globalization, with its rapid exchanges of information, has led
to the political success of marginalized groups that had little political
enfranchisement through the nation-state, such as indigenous groups, women,
and ethnic and racial minorities. Globalization and identity politics have eroded
the authority of the nation-state and national citizenship by challenging its context
and source. Globalization puts pressure on the national as trans- and inter-
national forces erode the sovereignty of individual states. If globalization is
challenging state sovereignty from without, then identity politics are challenging
state sovereignty from within, as new groups and communities claim political
power and the ability to define citizenship and rights for themselves. In the next
section, I will discuss how Brazil and Rio de Janeiro particularly exemplify the
failures of national citizenship and offer the opportunity to understand how
citizenship is reformulated and disputed in a specific context.
C. The case of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro
“One of the most harmful features of Western-style global dominance is the perpetual
rediscovery of its own perceived innocence. No amount of abuse and exploitation,
however catastrophic its consequences for the non-Western victims, seems able to
erode this sense of innocence.”
Richard Falk, Human Rights Horizons
1 . Democratization and the institutional approach to citizenship
Why should citizenship be an issue for international politics? It is obvious
how questions surrounding citizenship are relevant political questions within
given states. What makes citizenship equally relevant to international politics?
In the particular case of Latin America and international politics, citizenship is
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bound up in the entire thrust of US political science scholarship directed towards
Latin America. And the failure of the US model of democratic citizenship is
evident in multiple contexts across the region.
Most US political science scholarship regarding Latin America has
focused heavily on transitions to democracy and implementing democracy—what
political, social, economic, and cultural features and characteristics are
necessary, why certain countries have failed to implement the ‘democracy
formulas’ prescribed by American political theorists, etc. (see Farer 1996,
Diamond et al. 1988). This heavy focus on ‘fixing’ Latin America’s imperfect
record of pendulum swings between authoritative/totalitarian regimes and partial
democracies follows on a long tradition of US intervention and paternalism in the
region. The unwritten message beneath these institutional prescriptions is that
Latin America, like other ‘emerging democracies’ will benefit from the instruction
of other more established democracies. That instruction varies from academic
proposals to armed intervention (most recently in the case of Haiti). Yet
throughout this story of the US political science establishment advocating
transitions to democracy in Latin America, citizenship has only appeared at the
margins—as a diluted form of civic participation—as if the creation of citizens is
an automatic result of the promulgation of individual rights by newly restored
constitutions. Democracy is defined by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour
Martin Upset (all leading scholars on transition to democracy) as:
“a system of government that meets three essential conditions:
meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and
groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of
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government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of
force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the
selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair
elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a
level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom
of press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to
ensure the integrity of political competition and
participation”(Diamond, Linz, and Upset 1988: xvi).
This definition of democracy characterizes democracy through individual rights,
formal public political participation, and universalism. By inference, citizenship as
a result of this implementation of democracy would be individual rights for all
citizens protected through public political participation. The problem with this
definition of democracy and its correlate notion of citizenship is that it ignores the
distance between the formal institution of a democratic state and the
democratization of a highly stratified and hierarchical society. In practice, formal
citizenship in Latin America has not translated universally into meaningful
inclusion in a political community.
2. An expanded notion of democracy and citizenship
However both democracy and democratic citizenship turn sticky
somewhere between the theories of “institutional engineering” and actual practice
in Latin America. Democratization and the creation of democratic citizenship
have not been implemented with much success along traditional institutional
lines. Liberal constitutions and governments have not translated into democratic
societies, and democratic citizenship has remained nominal. Elizabeth Jelin
argues that although the data on poverty and exclusion in Latin America is well-
known, the “fact is that ‘democratization with adjustment’ is leaving out masses of
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people; this does not seem to be a passing, frictional phenomenon but rather part
and parcel of a process of structural marginalization’’(Jelin 1998; 407). There is a
long historical precedent in Latin America, from Spanish and Portuguese colonial
tradition, of a major disjuncture between formal laws and institutions and actual
implementation (Stein and Stein 1970). Apparently installing citizenship as
belonging and democracy in Latin America is more complex than implementing
the institutional features promoted by the most recent US political science
scholarship on democracy. Jelin argues that the differences between formal and
substantive citizenship in Latin America are a major obstacle to democracy
because those differences create opposing tendencies of inclusion and
exclusion. “Transition to democracy brings confusion and bewilderment. A new
space opens up for democratic discourse, for elections and participation. While
democratic discourse becomes hegemonic, the reality of economic relations is in
contradiction to it. Indeed, there is a double discourse: a discourse of
participation and a non-discourse of economic exclusion”(Jelin 1998: 408). But
what kind of citizenship is developing in Latin America’s newly minted
democracies? “Political democratization does not automatically produce a
strengthened civil society, a culture of citizenship, and a sense of social
responsibility’’(Jelin 1998: 409). So if the institutional prescriptions of US political
scientists are not sufficient to install democracy in Latin America, what is? Sonia
Alvarez, Evalina Dagnino and Arturo Escobar argue that "popular movements,
along with feminist, Afro-Latin American, lesbian and gay, and environmental
movements, have been instrumental in constructing a new conception of
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democratic citizenship, one that claims rights in society and not just from the
state, and that challenges the rigid social hierarchies that dictate fixed social
places for its (non)citizens on the basis of class, race, and gender”(Alvarez, et.
al. 1998: 12). Dagnino goes on to argue that social movements are essential to
transitions to democracy because they are concerned with democratizing not
only political institutions but also society as a whole (including social and
economic hierarchies and “cultural practices embodied in relations of exclusion
and inequality”)(Dagnino 1998: 47). For Dagnino, the central element to this
broader conception of democracy is a "re-definition of the notion of citizenship
and its core referent, the notion of rights”(Dagnino 74). Rather than a by-product
of institutional democratization, citizenship is at the forefront of debates about
identity and rights politics, globalization, and nationalism. Dagnino argues that
primary tool of social movements attempting to democratize Brazilian society has
been the “appropriation of the notion of citizenship which operationalizes their
enlarged view of democracy”(Dagnino 48).
Brazil, over the past fifty or so years, has passed through several
extremes in governance: from the Vargas regime’s authoritative populism, to an
inefficient military dictatorship in the 1970’s, to corrupt semi-democracy in the
1980’s and 1990’s. What are the implications of this roller coaster ride of
regimes for citizenship? Certainly formal citizenship has been very different
under each respective form of government. The assumption of the
democratization literature is that transition to democracy will also democratize
citizenship in the form of more rights and means of participation in the
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government and society. It seems clear that democracy has improved the rights
and degrees of participation for some in Brazil. But how has citizenship changed
for those on the margins, those who have not enjoyed political or economic
enfranchisement under any regime? And if democracy has not brought equal
citizenship, does the problem lie with the form of citizenship (i.e. traditional liberal
democratic citizenship), or with the form of democracy (i.e. imperfectly instituted
and corrupt). Diamond et.al. argue that the problem with Brazil’s democracy is
the implementation. But other scholars point to a system of deeply embedded
social and economic hierarchies: “Underneath the apparent cordiality of Brazilian
society, the notion of social places constitutes a strict code, very visible and
ubiquitous, in the streets and in the homes, in the state and in society, which
reproduces inequality in social relations at all levels, underlying social practices
and structuring an authoritarian culture’’(Dagnino 1998: 48). Maria Celia Paoli
and Vera da Silva Telles characterize Brazilian democracy and citizenship in the
1990’s as “a consolidated democracy that formally recognizes social rights, civil
guarantees, and citizens’ prerogatives but that coexists at the quotidian level with
violence and continual human rights violations, in a world that reveals the
antithesis of citizenship and basic rules of civility....This truncated system
guarantees democratic political rights but is unable to enforce the law, civil rights,
and justice in the heterogeneous terrain of social life’’(Paoli and Telles 1998: 65)
So Brazil demonstrates the major failings of national citizenship: there is a
long-standing and increasing divide between formal and substantive citizenship,
and the arrival of democracy and national citizenship has perpetuated the
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exclusion of certain groups by failing to influence the long-standing social
hierarchies in Brazilian society. Global capital flows have weakened the Brazilian
state through a series of economic crises as excluded groups such as the
Movimento Sem Terra (Movement of the Landless), Amazonian indigenous
groups, and the urban poor have articulated demands for new forms of
citizenship and rights.
For example, in her study on culture, citizenship, and democracy in Brazil,
Evalina Dagnino interviewed about fifty social activists regarding which of the
following qualities is most important for democracy: 1) there are several political
parties, 2) all have food and housing, 3) whites, blacks, men, women, rich, and
poor are all treated equally, 4) people can participate in unions and associations,
and 5) people can criticize and protest. Fifty-eight percent of the sample chose
the equal treatment of whites, blacks, men, women, rich, and poor as the most
important quality (Dagnino 1998: 53). Dagnino goes on to note that a large
majority of the poor and working class activists that she interviewed “mentioned
disrespect, discrimination, and prejudice as part of their daily experience in city;
referred to their to their status as ‘second-class citizens’: and complained of
mistreatment because of their race or because they were not dressed well
enough”(Dagnino 55). In short, Brazil exemplifies both the serious failings of
national democratic citizenship and the increasing attempts to recast citizenship
in response to those failings. Yet despite the traditional of a strong central
government in the Brazil, Brazil’s largest cities are the most important locations
for the dispute of new citizenships is the global city. In the case of Brazil, both
36
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are global cities with metropolitan-region
populations in excess of 13 million and 20 million respectively. It is in these cities
that the failings of citizenship are most evident in the juxtaposition of wealth and
poverty, and also where new citizenships are disputed and foreclosed.
Rio de Janeiro is a city of around 13 million, of which approximately one-
third live in illegal land occupancies called favelas (of varied economic status).
Figure 1: Housing in Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro’s population is comprised of a small elite/middle class and a large
majority of working poor. Many of Rio de Janeiro’s poor are migrants from other
poorer (darker) regions of Brazil, especially the Northeast. Favelas in Rio de
Janeiro are the most prominent imagery of the failings of citizenship—clusters of
irregular buildings crowed steep hillsides and riverbanks throughout the city. The
first favela was created by dockworkers after the city tore down their tenement
building in 1 898. They took over unused land near the docks in order to build
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temporary housing structures. There are now over 100 favelas in Rio, varying in
population from a few hundred to 400,000. Internally, the favelas are not
economically homogenous. The economic level of favela residents ranges from
indigent poverty to middle class. Since the early 1980’s the drug mafias have
gained increasing control of the favelas. Because the favelas are quasi-stateless
(i.e. the state has little insertion in the favelas), the drug mafias have
appropriated that space in order to protect their trading and distribution. In the
Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area, the murder rate has surpassed 80/100,000,
which more or less constitutes civil war. Almost all the murders occur in favelas,
poor suburbs, and housing projects. Rio de Janeiro exposes the most serious
failings of citizenship and also serves as the context for the articulation of new
forms of political authority, citizenship, and rights. In the next section, 1 will
address how the city is an important context for analyzing citizenship in the face
of the failures of national citizenship.
38
CHAPTER II
NEW CITIZENSHIPS
A. Citizenship in Cities
1. Introduction
Given this portrait of uncertainty in citizenship in the nation-state, what can
cities as a site for citizenship offer? The failures of citizenship, in part due to the
weakening of the authority of the nation-state, have led to the rise in importance
of new contexts for citizenship. Critics of the nation-state as the dominant form
of political organization and locus for citizenship suggest that citizenship can
exist in relation to other forms of political organizations and community. That is,
citizenship as a process of belonging or participating, can relate to a
transnational community (as in cosmopolitanism), or more particular communities
such as regions or even cities. There is a broad literature advocating
cosmopolitan citizenship, or citizenship in a world community (see Kant 1991,
Falk, Nye and Donahue 2000, Castles and Davidson 2000) in response to
pressures of globalization and the failures of nation-state citizenship to respond
to its own contradictions. There is also increased interest in considering
citizenship on a regional or city level as a layer of identity that represents part of
an overall citizenship (Isen 2000, Holston 1999). There is quite a long historical
trail of advocates for cosmopolitanism. But since the disappearance of Greek
and Italian city-states, cities have not been at the forefront of the debate over
citizenship.
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HowevBP, th© city, in particular, is an important sit© for consid©ring
citiz©nship. Engin ls©n argu©s citi©s play an ©ss©ntial rol© in d©t©rmining
citiz©nship. Th© "global flows of id©as, imag©s, sound and capital and labor both
©manating from and conc©ntrating in global citi©s hav© b©com© th© d©fining
mom©nts of our ag©. Y©t th© struggl©s [of th© poor, immigrants, woman,
©tc.]...pit groups against groups, and divid©, fragmant, confus© and shattar
idantitias, rights, sansibilitias, loyaltias and obligations... .Rathinking rights that
aris© in th© ag© of th© global city raquiras th© articulation of rights to th© city
rathar than rights of th© city as a container of politics. It also raquiras rathinking
citizenship... ”(lsan 2000: 15). Rathinking citizenship in th© context of th© city
provides th© opportunity to examine th© contradictions and ambiguities of
citizenship in th© nation-state. Th© exclusions so evident in cities and th© new
articulations of citizenship that originate from cities makes cities a particularly
compelling sit© for understanding citizenship: “In all of this commotion, it is
perhaps understandable to treat the city, that old form of human society as
irrelevant. But... cities may still be the important sites in which we experience the
crises of national membership and through which we may rethink
citizenship”(Holston and Appadurai 1999: 16).
While the city becomes an important source of identity and a meaningful
context for citizenship—cities also embody the worst failures of citizenship and
provide the critical space for the contestation of new rights and forms of
citizenship. Given that the city is an increasingly important site for citizenship in
the face of the weakening authority of the nation-state, there are two main
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reasons why it is important to consider citizenship in the context of the city. First,
national citizenship as demonstrated within cities offers stark evidence of the
failures of national citizenship as set out by the nation-state. Cities embody the
worst failures of national citizenship in terms of the extremes of inclusion and
exclusion. The contradictions and multiplicities of national citizenship are no
more evident than in the city—immense wealth along side extreme poverty in
overwhelming proportions. Nowhere does the promise of citizenship, of equal
rights for all citizens, ring more hollow than in cities—in terms of the “gap
between formal citizenship status and substantive citizen rights”(Beauregard and
Bounds 2000: 247). The second reason for considering citizenship in the context
of cities is that cities also represent an important location for the dispute and
formation of new forms of citizenship and rights because of the confluence of
different groups and identities in global cities. Cities represent the extremes of
citizenship’s possibilities: both national citizenship’s failures and the struggle for
new forms of citizenship and rights: In “some global cities...even as basic civil or
political rights are trampled upon by authorities, new rights, for example sexual or
technological rights, are also being claimed’’(lsen 2000: 3). If the global city
demonstrates the extremes of citizenship, that is at least partly because the
global city is uniquely influenced both by globalizing trends and the power of
identity politics that have eroded the authority of the nation-state (see Sassen
1991).
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How do cities demonstrate the failures of national citizenship? While cities
may be “the embodiment of contrasting moralities" (Boyle et. al. 1996), global
cities are also embodiment of contrasting citizenships. The contradictions of
citizenship are striking in cities: extremes of social inclusion and exclusion in the
same space, and gaping disparity between the promise of citizenship and its
fulfillment. Liberal democratic conceptions of national citizenship promise equal
citizenship to all citizens of a nation-state. Cities, as a particular context,
represent a serious challenge to that conception of citizenship by demonstrating
the worst failures of national citizenship: can poverty, exclusion, and extreme
social injustices nullify the meaning of citizenship? In particular, contrasting
levels of citizenship are evidenced in the city in terms of how citizenship works in
relations to different layers of the city. That is, power flows unevenly through
cities political, economic, and social landscapes, as do degrees and types of
citizenship. The context of the city offers a critique of national citizenship
manifested in several layers: the spatial organization of the city, economic and
class dynamics, and the issues of gender and race. The failures of national
citizenship are evident in each of these particular contexts in Rio de Janeiro.
First, the spatial divisions in Rio de Janeiro act to reduce practical citizenship for
certain people by reducing access to the city’s resources—from the job market to
public space and leisure. As such, urban space in Rio de Janeiro becomes a
text for reading how certain groups and areas are excluded from citizenship.
Second, socio-economic levels span a large spectrum in Rio de Janeiro—both
the very rich and the very poor share some of the same space and the same
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city. But the socio-economic stratification in Rio de Janeiro translates into
different degrees of citizenship. The urban poor in do not enjoy the same degree
of citizenship as the rich and middle class. Finally, issues of race and gender
represent another cleavage in substantive citizenship in Rio de Janeiro.
Specifically, women and blacks are not included equally in the category of
citizen. Women and blacks in Rio de Janeiro are groups that do not enjoy full
substantive citizenship, because both the notion of citizenship and the nature of
public political participation erase certain groups from meaningful citizenship.
These particular contexts demonstrate how citizenship in the context of Rio de
Janeiro fails—in terms of providing access and belonging to all citizens in Rio de
Janeiro. These failings, demonstrated so markedly in Rio de Janeiro, are a
reflection of the failings of national democratic citizenship in general. In
investigating these various aspects of the city and the challenges these layers
pose to national citizenship, it remains uncertain whether the city as a context will
serve to strengthen or weaken the concept of citizenship.
But while cities represent the starkest failings of national citizenship, the
struggles to attain rights and to define new rights for different groups are also
largely played out in cities. The processes of identity formation and the
subsequent political ramifications take place largely in cities. “Today, the rights
of immigrants, ethnic and racialized groups, gays and lesbians, women, the poor
and other groups are by and large fought for in global cities”(lsen 2000: 15). The
city showcases patterns of exclusion and inclusion and also inverts power
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relationships in unexpected ways. These power relationships and cleavages in
citizenship do not foreclose the possibility of the formations of new rights and
citizenships.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the city is that the poor, the excluded, and
the marginal can, through the place that they hold in the city, have access to
political power. “In the context of a strategic space such as the global city, the
types of disadvantaged people described here are not simply marginal; they
acquire presence in a broader political process that escapes the boundaries of
the formal polity”(Sassen 2000: 58). Taking Isen’s suggestion and considering
citizenship in cities as the rights to the city rather than rights in the city, creates a
series of possibilities for understanding citizenship within the city that can, in the
end, offer a meaningful critique of the tenets of Western liberal citizenship and
citizenship at the level of the nation.
For example, in the introduction to the Cities and Citizenship (1999),
James Holston discusses how social movements of the urban poor that have
been expanding the nature and conception of rights and citizenship: “Rights
become more of a claim on than possessions held against the world. They
become claims on society for the resources necessary to meet the basic needs
and interests of members rather than a kind of property some possess and
others do not....[l]n terms of rights to the city and rights to political participation,
rights become conceived as aspects of social relatedness rather than as inherent
and natural proprieties of the individual”(1 1 ). The implication for citizenship of
this change in the conception of rights is that "people have rights to a minimum
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standard of living that does not depend on their relative economic or market
worth but on their absolute rights as citizens to a measure of economic well being
and dignity”(Holston 1999, 11). This new conception of citizenship and rights are
based on specific claims to resources and access and "not defined in existing
constitutions or legal codes”(Holston 11). In the city it is clear that citizenship is
determined by the level of access to the resources of the city (such as
transportation, adequate housing, the labor market, etc.)
The city is an important site for citizenship because the ills that plague
citizenship in the context of the nation-state (e.g. the gap between formal and
substantive citizenship and the myth of the equality of individual rights) are no
where more evident than in the city. In the city these contradictions are forced to
live side by side—to inhabit the same space from the slum on the hill above the
gated high-rise to neighborhoods uneasily built of immigrants from different
religions, nationalities, and races. And because cities reflect such contradictions,
it is precisely in cities that new forms and meanings of citizenship are being
forged and torn down. So while the failings of citizenship are evident in the
spatial and socio-economic divisions and along racial and gender lines in Rio de
Janeiro, those same contexts provide examples of new ways that citizenship is
being defined.
In a contextual analysis, the failings of citizenship become increasingly
clear. In order to shift an analysis of citizenship from liberalism’s tunnel vision of
universalized individual-based citizenship to a contextualized and particular
perspective, the next section traces various features of the city of Rio de Janeiro
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that demonstrate how cleavages in citizenship translate into diminished rights to
the city and a diminished meaning of citizen. In terms of specific elements of
the urban environment of Rio de Janeiro, spatial divisions, socio-economic
stratification, and race and gender, citizenship has been failing.®
2
^_ Cleavages in Rio de Janeiro’s Citizenship
a. Spatial
Space in a city is a very rich source of information about larger social and
cultural constructs. The city, as a built environment is a “representation of
specific ideologies, of social, political, economic, and cultural relations and
practices, of hierarchies and structures, which not only represent but also,
inherently constitute these same relations and structures’’(King 1999). Spatially,
the city represents a particular implementation of citizenship (see Holston 1999,
Caldeira 1999, and Harvey 2000). Access to different spaces in the city means
access to jobs, health care, education, leisure. Lack of access to those spaces
means lack of access to those same resources. Access (or the lack thereof) to
those resources can heavily influence social inequalities, trapping certain groups
* The examples and anecdotes in the following section are based on open-ended interviews with
residents and community leaders in favelas, housing projects, and working class neighborhoods
in Rio de Janeiro between June 2000 and September 2001. In most cases, I conducted multiple
interviews with each person. Additional observations about politics and social policy in Rio de
Janeiro are in part based on interviews with city government officials (including Andr6 Urani,
Minister of Labor under Paulo Conde, Paulo Sirkis, Minister of Urbanism under the current
adminstration of Cesar Maia, Paulo Magalh§es, the Vice President for Urban Issues of the
government’s development bank (Caixa Economica Federal) and Lu Peterson, Special Assistant
to the Mayor for Housing Policy): and with NGO leaders including Robert Ottolenghi, Executive
Director of the UN Habitat Program in Latin America, Ruben Cesar, founder and president of Viva
Rio, Moema Miranda of ISER, and Marlene Fernandes, urban planner with the Institute Brasileiro
de Administra?§o Municipal (IBAM); and academics, including Carlos Lessa, current president of
the Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Joao Saboia, director of the institute de
Economia (UFRJ), Mercio Gomez, professor of anthropology at the Universidade Federal
Fluminense (UFF), Zaire Cheibub, director of Data UFF, and Marcelo Neri, researcher and
professor of political economy at the Fundagao Getulio Vargas, during the same time period.
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of people in localities devoid of economic and social opportunities (Van Kempen
1997). Further, the overall spatial organization of a city—which areas have
access to public transportation or major transportation arteries, which areas have
urban services, etc. has broad reaching implications for residents’ ability to have
access to the city as a whole. In particular, the ways that different people from
the city are able to interact in public space also represents the social structures
of the city.
In actual effects, urban space and the boundaries that cross it are as
formidable as the boundaries that separate nation-states in that these boundaries
divide access to the labor market, to leisure, culture, wealth, etc. (not just
nationalities and races). The border that divides the North from the South divides
the city in a very particular way. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the city is divided
into two main regions—the wealthy, beautiful Zona Sul (South Zone), and the
working class, industrial Zona Norte (North Zone), Zona Oeste (West Zone), and
suburbios (suburbs)^. It is the same kind of border as between Tijuana and San
Diego, or between the Bronx and Manhattan. It is a border that permits the poor
to cross over for work, but little else. And the rich never need to cross the
border, unless it is for some type of leisure. People from the Zona Norte and the
suburbs cross the border to the Zona Sul every day—for work. But residents in
the Zona Sul never cross into the Zona Norte except for certain types of
’ Suburbios in Rio de Janeiro are very different from suburbs surrounding American or European
cities. Suburbios are very poor, working class neighborhoods dotted with favelas and housing
projects. Suburbio residents generally commute very long distances to work in the Zona Sul. The
main difference between these neighborhoods and the favelas is that residents of suburbio
neighborhoods have legal property rights.
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leisure—samba, soccer, and sex. On very specific occasions, residents from the
Zona Sul cross into the Zona Norte. During Carnaval, residents from the Zona
Sul cross into the Zona Norte to attend samba school events, although most rich
cariocas go to Miami and Europe as the ‘poor masses’ take over the city. The
major soccer stadium is on the edge of the Zona Norte and draws crowds from
all regions of the city. And, of course, most of the sex motels (where rooms are
hired by the hour) are also in the Zona Norte. Apart from these exceptions, the
residents of the Zona Sul very rarely cross into the Zona Norte. In addition, when
the residents of the Zona Norte do cross over to the Zona Sul other than for
work, the reaction of the Zona Sul residents is to vacate the city (as in Carnaval).
This spatial division between the Zona Sul and the Zona Norte/Zone
Oeste/suburbios is marked by the geographical barrier of the Parque Nacional da
Floresta da Tijuca—a chain of mountains several thousand feet high that cut a
green swath across the city. In addition to this major geographical barrier, the
two regions of the city are separated by their very disparate economic levels.
This economic disparity enforces the spatial division. Although there are some
favelas in the Zona Sul, the Zona Norte etc. portion of the city is on average
much poorer. With the exception of the few favelas in the Zona Sul, residents in
the Zona Norte etc. can not afford to live in the Zona Sul, so there is little spatial
mixing of class. For example, a family might expect to pay around US$900 for a
two-bedroom apartment in the Zona Sul, whereas an apartment of the same size
in the Zona Norte would cost around US$200 and even less if it were in a favela.
In addition to the economic disparity that enforces the spatial divisions in Rio de
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Janeiro, the transportation system also enforces this boundary. Most major
transportation routes, including bus lines, trains, and the subway runs from the
Zona Norte/Zone Oeste into the Zone Sul. (There is one line that runs from the
center into the Zona Sul, but it generally carries domestic works connecting from
the line that services the Zona Norto and suburbios.) These public transportation
routes are the only way most residents in the Zona Norte etc. can reach the Zona
Sul since very few can afford cars. The public transportation routes (especially
North-South) are grossly overcrowded, expensive, and subject to frequent
assault. Even the daily experience of commuting to work from the Zona Norte
etc. into the Zona Sul is prohibitive.
This major spatial division in the city translates into different levels of
access to the city. Those who live in the Zona Sul have the best access to many
of the city’s resources: the job market, the best education, hospitals with
adequate supplies, beaches and parks, etc. The Zona Norte is lacking in all
these resources. Living in the Zona Sul makes everything more accessible;
education, employment, health care, housing, leisure, etc. Figure 2 shows the
percentages of households without access to basic urban services. These
households are entirely in favelas and the Zona Norte, Zona Oeste, and
suburbios (UNDP 2000).
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Figure 2: Households in Rio de Janeiro lacking urban services
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Another primary difference between the Zona Norte and the Zona Sul is the level
of public security. In the Zona Norte, police-sponsored violence and drug related
violence is a regular occurrence; whereas, the Zona Sul is relatively free from
these problems. An indication of the very different qualities of life in different
parts of the city is that the life expectancy at birth for the Zona Sul is 72, while in
the Zona Norte the average life expectancy at birth is 65 (UNDP 2001). The
infant mortality rate is five times higher in favelas than in ‘asfalto’ or legal
neighborhoods, and death from chronic diseases, and murder rates are also all
higher in the Zona Norte (see figure 3) (UNDP 2001).
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Figure 3: Homicide rates by region in Rio de Janeiro
The spatial divisions in Rio de Janeiro translate into different levels of
citizenship by restricting the flows of people in particular ways, and also by
limiting access to the city’s resources along spatial lines. The boundary between
the North and the South in Rio de Janeiro perpetuates a dynamic of social
integration and exclusion. The poor cross into the Zona St// for work, and the
rich into the Zona Norte on specific occasions for leisure. In addition, this spatial
division stratifies the degree of access to important urban services and the city’s
resources in terms of access to the city. Residents of the Zona Norte do not
enjoy the same degree of citizenship as residents of the Zona Sul.
b. Socio-economic
Another important source of cleavage for citizenship in Rio de Janeiro is
economics and class. Parallel but not equal to the spatial dimensions of
citizenship are economic and class distinctions. In Rio de Janeiro, the poorest
40% of the population earns approximately US$43 per month, while the richest
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one percent earns on average more than US$2,553 per month, and this
inequality has risen over the past 10 years {Journal do Brasil 2002). In Rio de
Janeiro, economic and class distinctions have dramatic implications for
citizenship and rights to the city. The poor and the working class are dispersed
spatially throughout the city and the suburbs. The suburbs are almost entirely
poor and working class and the city itself has enclaves of poor and working class.
Class and economic power in Rio de Janeiro define important aspects of citizens’
interactions with the city. Economic and class pressures act directly upon the
ability to participate as a citizen of the city. Narayan highlights how economic
independence and earning have been fundamental to the vision of democratic
citizenship (Narayan 1991: 50). In addition to the symbolic weight of earning as
necessary to citizenship (particularly in light of neoliberal reforms), poverty and
class limit the forms of participation. Participation in the city is reduced to an
effort for survival with no further margins for participation in the city that would
mean broader citizenship.
The poor and the working class face increasingly precarious daily
situations. Costs of living including rent and property prices, food, and
transportation are constantly increasing and salaries and the minimum wage do
not keep up. In addition, the sorts of jobs available to the poor and the working
class are limited. On one hand the lack of access to education for the poor limits
the types of occupations viable for the poor and the working class. On the other
hand, changes in the labor market (primarily globalization) further stratify jobs
into two categories that Wacquant calls the "crystallization of a new international
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division of labor": unskilled wage labor and highly specialized professional labor
(Wacquant 1998:1640; see also Sassen 1991, 1994, 1999). The sorts of
occupations that used to offer space for changing social status and class are
disappearing. “Where poverty in the Western metropolis used to be largely
residual or cyclical, embedded in working-class communities, geographically
diffuse and considered remediable by means of further market expansion, it now
appears to be increasingly long-term if not permanent, disconnected from macro
economic trends... social isolation and alienation feed upon each other as the
chasm between those consigned [to poverty] and the rest of society
deepens’’(Wacquant 1640). In interviews with several elderly men and women
living in extreme poverty in favelas or housing projects, I was told the most
important right of a citizen is the right to be obligated to work, to do “good work.”
Participation in the society becomes purely working in an un-skilled wage job,
because that is necessary for individual and family survival. Economic hardship
creates pressure that constrains social participation to labor. Globalization
“proceeds selectively, including and excluding segments of economies and
societies in and out of the networks of information, wealth, and power...“(Castels
1998: 225). Globalization is exacerbating the division between rich and poor (as
in the ghettoization of America’s major cities and the immense and rapidly
growing slum settlements surrounding Latin America’s major cities). Rio de
Janeiro’s wealthy residents can access the city in more contexts because of their
economic status—^from the public space of beaches and parks to cultural events
to the government. Yet economic exclusion is not all-powerful. There are ways
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in which this division is challenged. The poor and working class in Rio de Janeiro
have achieved political influence that belies their economic states. Despite
communities plagued by violence (both state-sponsored and drug-related) and
lacking urban services, the sheer number of poor in Rio translates into political
weight. Women from the working class that work as maids and housekeepers
leverage these jobs to get more access to the city through loans from their
bosses, connections to get their children education, better access to hospitals,
etc. Nonetheless, the economic stratification of the city is an indication of the
division between formal and substantive citizenship. A measure of this division
and the lack their citizenship that the urban poor face is that their political power
has not influenced the economic and social factors that engender urban poverty,
nor has it translated into greater citizenship in the city in terms of access to the
city’s resources,
c. Race and gender
In Rio de Janeiro, citizenship has a color, and it has a gender. It is white
and male. Why doesn’t the right to vote for women and blacks (read former
slaves) mean equal citizenship in a democratic society? This is not only because
elected officials are overwhelmingly white and male. It is also because race and
gender represent what is excluded in the city. Citizen in Rio de Janeiro is not a
universal category—certain groups are excluded and erased by the so-called
universal conception of citizen, while others are privileged. The gender of
citizenship in Rio is male because the private—the family, children, unwaged
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work-is erased from public and political importance « Citizens have citizenship
because of rights demarcated purely in the public realm. The divisions of gender,
privileging the public, mask patterns of exclusion and subordination in the private.
“Even when women are allowed the rights and responsibilities of citizenship
formerly reserved for men, underlying sexual politics degrades what has been
labeled as feminine”(Marso 1998: 2). Citizenship, with its hegemonic assertions
of the validity of public, is complicitous in these gender exclusions. So while
rights and citizenship in the public realm, such as voting and freedom of political
association are important; they are not sufficient for real citizenship in a society.
The layer of citizenship that pertains to the ‘private’ is unprotected by nominal
citizenship in the ‘public’.
Just as ‘woman’ does not have purchase within citizenship’s discourse in
Rio de Janeiro, neither does ‘race’. Race, as a category of identity and political
challenge, is totally absent from citizenship in Rio de Janeiro. There may be
some black members of government, but there is no language within the
citizenship discourse to address the issue of race and its relationship to society.
Race is called many other names—the poor, the immigrants (because many are
dark skinned), the working class—but race as meaningful source of identity and
community is almost non-existent in public discourse. What are lauded are
cultural practices of black origin—dance and music (chorinho, samba, baile funk,
capoiera), festivals (Carnaval, Revillon), and art. These cultural features of racial
identity are appropriated by mainstream society in Brazil and celebrated as
® The next section will explore more carefully how citizenship is gendered.
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Brazilian. Despite the celebration of these ‘safe’ forms of racial identity, there is
no space in terms of political, social, and economic rights to the city to allow race
t enter (see Davis 1999). This treatment of racial identity as purely cultural in
citizenship discourse in Rio de Janeiro amounts to an erasure of the history of
slavery in Brazil under the power popular myth of ‘racial democracy’. That is,
Brazilian national identity hinges on the construction of a racial democracy where
race is not a factor for exclusion. In practices, this notion of racial democracy
and a single Brazilian race obscures the long history of slavery in Brazil that has
not been fully addressed in terms of its social implications. Interestingly,
emerging (and very angry) Afro-Brazilian movements in Rio de Janeiro have
begun to challenge the idea of ‘racial democracy’ through cultural participation,
especially music and graffiti e.g. Afro-Reggae, O Rappa, Cidade Negra, and Seu
Ze.
But neither race nor gender is non-existent in terms of their social
implications. Women, especially poor women, do not have the same level of
citizenship as men. Blacks and mulattos do not have the same level of
citizenship as whites. In Rio de Janeiro, women are 38% more likely to be poor
than men (and the rate is higher in the case of single mothers) {Journal do Brasil
2002). They also have less access to education because at an earlier age they
assume ‘private’ responsibilities like childcare and household work (UNECLAC
1997). Women take the responsibility for education and care for children,
household work, and waged work (because no family can survive with only one
wage-earner)—women account for 1/3 of the total work force (UNECLAC 1997).
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Women in favelas, in large part, go to work in the homes of wealthy women in the
Zona Sul: over 50% of women in the work force work in informal service jobs
(UNECLAC 1997). But women earn on average less than men for the same
work {Journdl do Brosil 2002). Women, while they have a longer life expectancy
than men by three years, are more likely to die from child birth, cancer of the
uterus and other easily treatable conditions (UNECLAC 1997). In sum, women
experience very specific social and economic exclusions in relation to the city’s
resources, and the conflict between those exclusions and traditional household
responsibilities is erased from the citizenship discourse.
For blacks and people of color, citizenship in Rio de Janeiro means
economic exclusion is pared with cultural appropriation and political irrelevance.
Blacks and people of mixed race in Rio de Janeiro are more than twice as likely
to be illiterate as whites, have on average five years less schooling, earn 48%
less than whites, and are more likely to be unemployed and poor (see figures 4,
5, and 6).
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Figure 4: Unemployment in Rio de Janeiro by race and sex
35.0%
30.0%
T30
^
25.0%
Q.
E
0 20 .0%
3
0
^
15.0%
c0
o
0
CL
10 .0%
5.0%
0 .0%
White
Afro-Brazilian
Male
Sex
Female
Figure 5: Years of education in Rio de Janeiro by race
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Figure 6: Access to urban services in Rio de Janeiro by race
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Of the 10% poorest in Rio de Janeiro, 45% are black. Of the richest one percent,
85% are white. These figures have changed very little over the past century
(IPEA 2002). The social and economic exclusion of blacks and women in Rio de
Janeiro an example of how national citizenship masks the exclusion of certain
groups and the privileging of others. ‘Citizen’ in Rio de Janeiro is not a universal
category—certain groups and identities are excluded, such as women and
blacks, through the lack of substantive citizenship in the city. The masking and
exclusion of certain groups from ‘citizen’ and citizenship empties the traditional
notion of citizenship of meaning to some extent for those groups. Because
citizenship is racialized and gendered, traditional citizenship lacks meaning for
Afro-brazil ians and women.
The city shows how citizenship can be uneven for different groups. In
spatial terms, your address directly affects your level of citizenship. Living in a
favela or housing project means a lower degree of inclusion in the city and less
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citizenship. Similarly, socio-economic cleavages in the city translate into different
degrees of citizenship. In Rio de Janeiro, economic inequality is dramatic.
These economic and social inequalities translate into failures in substantive
citizenship. Finally, race and gender represent ways that particular groups are
excluded from citizenship in the city. All citizens in Rio de Janeiro are not equal.
In particular contexts it is clear that citizenship is failing in Rio de Janeiro—not all
citizenships and citizens are equal.
That citizenship is failing is more than evident, but how it is failing is a
more complex issue. In order to understand how traditional citizenship is failing,
it is necessary to move beyond contextual examples of citizenship’s failures to
examine the dynamics of those failures. The next section will consider how
citizenship fails at the level of a particular group that does not enjoy equal
citizenship (women) in terms of the central claims of liberalism and national
citizenship: universalism, individualism, and the divide between the public and
the private. I have argued that democratic national citizenship is failing partially
because of its links to central tenets of liberalism in the nation-state. Those links
create a dynamic of exclusion that works to erase particular issues and people
from the vision of legitimate citizenship. The ‘hows’ of citizenship’s failings are
linked to the traditional definition of citizenship as universal for all individuals
acting politically in the public sphere. This generalized vision of citizenship fails
on the level of women’s every day lives in very concrete terms. In order to
evaluate the dynamics of citizenship’s failures at the level of women’s daily lives,
the next section examines citizenship beyond the claims of the liberalism: 1)
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beyond the public/private divide, 2) in terms of a process of belonging and having
access, and 3) as a notion of citizen that is not truly universal, but evokes certain
identities while obscuring others.
B. A feminist re-thinking of citizenship—methodology for a study of citizenship
I have argued that the ideological tenets of liberalism have become
intertwined with notions of national citizenship in the nation-state. The
implication of this connection between liberalism, the nation-state, and citizenship
is that the failings of citizenship happen outside the borders of the liberal national
conception of citizenship. Since that conception is based on universalism,
individualism and individual rights, and the public-private divide, this section
examines how the failures of citizenship for specific groups like women occur
beyond the public-private divide, in terms of lack of access to the society’s
resources, and in terms of the role of citizen as conflicting with other roles. That
is, in order to examine the dynamics of the failures of national citizenship in the
context of liberalism, this section examines how citizenship fails in the spaces
outside of the liberal conception of national citizenship. Yet while these spaces
demonstrate how citizenship is failing, they are also the spaces where new forms
of citizenship and new kinds of rights are being advanced. In assessing
citizenship at this level it is necessary to ask: What is citizenship like for women
in the city? What are the layers and degrees of citizenship for women in the city?
How does the role of citizen affect women?
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This project entails a feminist re-examination of national citizenship. In
order to understand citizenship’s failings in connection to certain tenets of
liberalism and the nation-state, this section examines citizenship for women in
ways that are normally outside the scope of citizenship and the tunnel vision of
liberalism. First, where citizenship in the nation-state is based on the notion of
universality, this section examines how citizenship works in a particular context.
This analysis will move the focus of citizenship from the universal to the particular
because the previous examples of how citizenship fails along certain cleavages
in the city suggests that the dynamics of citizenship’s failures are expressed in
particular contexts. Second, where citizenship in the nation-state is based on the
notion of valid political participation in the public as distinct from the private, this
section considers citizenship in terms of what is the so-called private. This divide
between the public and private cordons off important failures of citizenship by
placing them in the private where they do not have political relevance. However,
it is in the so-called private that the intersection between citizenship and women
is the strongest—and also there that citizenship’s failures are most strongly
manifest. Finally, where citizenship in the nation-state is based on the notion of
individualism, and the abstracted ideal of an individual separate from any
contextual links, this section will examine how the role of citizen works to exclude
certain aspects of women’s lives. The democratic model of citizenship relies
upon the universalizing or generalizing of both the type of citizenship (specific
rights for all) and the citizen (all democratic citizens are equal). Yet the
ambiguities of citizenship suggest the very process of generalizing citizenship
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and citizans acts to axcluda cartain paopla and idaas. If tha articulation batwaan
tha particular (tha citizan) and tha ganaral (a univarsalizad citizanship) is
problamatic, addrassing citizanship at tha laval of tha particular (in this casa
woman’s daily livas) can addrass that tansion.
But first, why usa a faminist approach to analyzing tha failuras of
citizanship? Jaan Franco dascribas faminism as a “position (not axclusiva to
woman) that dastabilizas both fundamantalism and tha naw opprassiva
structuras that ara amarging with lata capitalism”(Franco 1998: 287). It is in this
sansa that faminism is a usaful analytical and thaoratical tool for unravaling tha
ways that citizanship has baan slipping
—
pracisaly bacausa faminism is most
concarnad with whom citizanship is not working for. Sinca citizanship has baan
closaly tiad up with tha nation-stata (and its patriarchal structure), faminism is a
vary appropriate tool to unpack the problems of citizenship. A feminist approach
places the focus for research in a very different place than traditional political
science research. A feminist approach asks; How does citizenship work in a
particular context, in the family, in the social networks, and in the interaction
between local and the political? How does citizenship intersect with the every
day experiences of members of a society? What kind of citizen is promoted by
the notion of universalized democratic citizenship in the public sphere and what
kind of citizen is erased?
Specifically, this study will examine citizenship 1 ) beyond the
public/private divide in terms of the daily life of women, 2) as a process of
belonging and achieving access to the city, and 3) as the casting of citizens with
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certain roles and identities that exclude and de-value other roles. Examining
citizenship’s failures in these ways is a direct response to the relationship
between citizenship and central ideological features of the nation-state and
liberalism.
First, since national democratic citizenship is founded on the precept of
the public and the general, examining citizenship and its failures in the city
requires inverting the private-public distinction (Elshtain in Narayan 1991).
Yuval-Davis argues that “the construction of the boundary between the private
and the public is a political act itself,” and that the “most important contribution of
feminism to social theory has been the recognition that power relations operate
within primary social relations as well as within more impersonal secondary
social relations of the civil and political domains”(2000: 184). The same
public/private boundary in citizenship is also political. And just as power relations
operate within primary social relations (in Yuval-Davis’ terms), citizenship also
operates at the personal level. So, for example, in Western political tradition, the
public sphere is where political participation has value. Issues of gender, culture,
family, religion are considered ‘private sphere’ and thus not political in
comparison to liberalism’s universalist public sphere (Castels and Davidson
2000: 124). Issues of the private sphere, like family relations, social networks,
access to education, health care, leisure, etc. are not part of the traditional
definition of citizenship. However, a feminist re-working of that division breaks
down the divide between private and public—not to assert that the private is the
public, but rather to examine how the so-called private relates to the so-called
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public, and how the political cuts across both the private and the public. In terms
of citizenship, this means understanding how what is normally deemed ‘the
private,’ (and not what is public) is actually at the forefront of determining
people’s degree of citizenship. For example, the traditional forms of public
political participation, such as voting, membership in a political party, participation
in local committees or signing petitions are insufficient to describe the level of
citizenship. In Brazil since the end of the dictatorship in the early 1980’s, voting
has been obligatory for the entire adult population. Yet although the entire adult
population votes, such participation in the public sphere has not translated into
actual citizenship in the society. Why? Because, on a daily basis certain people
experience exclusion from the concrete economic, social, and cultural resources
of their society. This exclusion or lack of access is not addressed by the
formality of voting. The public act of voting only serves to accentuate how
woefully inadequate public political participation is in the face of the lack of
access to so many specific facets of society. And so the private sphere becomes
the only viable place to assess how citizenship is working.
The unit of analysis for citizenship in this study will be the ‘private’—the
family and personal relationships. Although they are also subject to political,
cultural, and ideological constructions, families and personal relationships as
forms of social organization have persisted for longer than nation-states and
regime-changes. So how citizenship is contextualized in the ‘private’ is important
to understanding how citizenship works in general. Specifically, the next section
addresses the intersection between the family and citizenship, and the
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relationship between violence, public safety, and the family. The intersection
between family and citizenship is important because the family is the prism that
citizenship passes through at the level of the particular.® For example, family
dynamics and relationships inform citizenship through the types of roles
advanced in the family—‘mother’ has particular responsibilities in the family that
can conflict with the role of a public citizen. The intersection between violence,
safety and citizenship is important because while the city government treats
violence as a public problem, the costs of violence are often paid at the level of
the private. For women, the lack of security on a daily basis is a major failing of
citizenship—and the implications of that violence on women’s daily lives means
that violence is experienced at the level of the private where the state is not
addressing the problem.
Second, traditional democratic citizenship is based on individual rights.
Describing citizenship in the nation-state through lists of rights or obligations for
individuals misses an entire realm of citizenship, which is how citizenship is a
process of belonging or achieving access (Narayan 1991, Walby 1994, Schild
1998). By belonging, I mean belonging to a society in a general sense that
includes having access to a broad range of the society’s resources and features
from the job market to cultural activities and health care. The failure of
democratic citizenship on many levels to bring access to the city (or belonging)
® Personal and family relationships are not the only relationships that are important to
understanding citizenship in terms of the ‘private’. For example, labor relations and employment
connections, religious connections, and political and social activism are important forms of
personal relationships that relate to citizenship. However, in terms of the women that I
interviewed, the most important source of personal relationship was the family. For the sake of
space, I have chosen to focus on the family.
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suggests that democratic citizenship itself is devoid of meaning to some. The
fact is that lack of access to housing, adequate food and security, health care,
education, and jobs excludes certain groups—especially the urban poor—from
substantive citizenship (see Holston 1999). Democratic citizenship in the nation-
state, as based in individuality, rationalism, the private-public divide, and
universalism has failed many in the sense that it has not translating into
belonging to the society nor having access to its resources. In Rio de Janeiro,
this vision of citizenship has failed in some instances to create citizens and has
reinforced the status of subject in others. In the face of no definitive reference for
citizenship, Narayan’s process of belonging and achieving access becomes
central to imagining citizenship. On a daily basis, it is access to the resources of
the society that most affect people’s lives. The next section will consider
women’s citizenship in the city as a process of belonging (and gaining access), in
order to understand what layers and levels of citizenship exist in the city. How do
women negotiate their citizenship in the city? What are the pathways of access
and belonging open and created for their citizenship? The idea of a universal and
general citizen/citizenship tends to draw focus away from daily life. A feminist re-
examination casts citizenship as a process of belonging and having access
rather than a list of rights and responsibilities in the public sphere. That is, a
feminist re-examination of citizenship shifts the focus away from the general and
towards the particular—towards the everyday problems of getting education,
health care, access to jobs, etc. Specifically this study examines women’s levels
of access to particular resources of the city that are most important on a daily
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basis: public services (including education, health care and contraception, urban
services, and public space/leisure), to the job market, and to housing and
legitimate land holdings.
Finally, national citizenship is based on the notion of an individual as
citizen. That citizen is the recipient of equal rights—and all citizens are therefore
equal. But in practice, not all citizens are equal. Further the ostensibly universal
and general notion of citizen is not neutral. The neutral category of citizen masks
the privileging of certain groups and interests and the exclusion of others. The
democratic model of citizenship relies upon the universalizing or generalizing
both the type of citizenship (specific rights for all) and citizen (all democratic
citizens are equal). Yet the nature of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro suggests that
neither citizenship nor citizens can be generalized and that the very process of
generalizing citizenship and citizens acts to exclude certain people and ideas.
If citizenship has failed for certain people, and the traditional definition of
citizenship erases certain kinds of citizens, where can we look for what has been
left out and excluded? A feminist re-examination of citizenship uncovers spaces
and identities that are pushed out of traditional evaluations of citizenship. That
is, the structure of power relationships affects all levels of political, economic, and
cultural features of that society. And the nature of power relationships and how
they intersect constructs a particular type of citizenship and a particular type of
citizen. In so doing, citizenship is defined narrowly as civic participation and
citizen as a generalized individual. Citizenship as defined as a public form of
participation in society evokes a certain type of citizen. That is an individual.
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abstracted from any context, who is equal in rights and responsibilities with every
other individual in the same society. Over the past century, the project of
Western nation-states has been to “transcend by citizenship particular
biological... historical, economic, social, religious or cultural belonging; to define
the citizen as an abstract individual without particular identifying qualities, as
beyond all his/her cultural determinants”(Schnapper in Castels and Davidson
2000: 213). This kind of generalized citizen does not have other conflicting roles,
like that of a mother (who is responsible for nurturing and caring for children and
managing the household), or the consumer (who is responsible for participating
in the market economy). The promotion of a particular kind of citizen and a
particular citizenship is politically powerful. “The all consuming focus of the
discourse of the right...on categories of people such as single mothers and
welfare ‘bums’, and more generally on the moral imperatives of restructuring
social programs, illustrates the degree to which the identities and conduct of
individuals matter to the state... .’Citizenship’ is a pivotal category in this
redefinition of collective and individual identities’’(Schild 1998: 98). So in
examining the slippages of democratic citizenship, it is important to consider
what kinds of citizens and citizenships are erased. The notion of the universal
individual masks the promotion of specific political interests. The most important
forces that shape this notion of citizen in Rio de Janeiro are the social
implications of neoliberal reforms, and the nature of political and cultural
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participation. Specifically, this study will examine type of citizen and citizenship
evoked by 1 ) neoliberal reforms and the market citizen, 2) public participation in
the city, and 3) cultural participation in the city.
One potential criticism of this approach is that a post-structural and
feminist analysis leaves no room for addressing concrete problems such as
urban poverty (Bulbeck 1998:15). However, the focus of this study is to use a
feminist, post-structural analysis to understand a particular citizenship in a
particular context. Hopefully, this grounded approach to the problem of
citizenship’s failures will be able to inform how to address those failures.
The following analysis is based on over forty open-ended interviews
conducted between July 2000 and March 2002 in Rio de Janeiro (see
questionnaire in Appendix 1 ). The primary source of the research is the
interviews that I conducted with women in six extended families (e.g. interviews
with three to four members of the same family of different generations). These
interviews incorporate families from different spaces, classes, and races from
within Rio de Janeiro: families from favelas, families from housing projects,
families from the working-class suburbs, and families from the middle class. The
following analysis also incorporates, as a secondary research source, multiple
interviews of community leaders, non-profit workers, and members of the
government for supplemental information on citizenship.
It is important to note that there are some important differences between
different groups of women in Rio de Janeiro. ‘Women’ are in no way a
homogenous social group in Rio de Janeiro. Perhaps the most marked
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diff6r6nc6s ar© class diffarsncasi womsn from th© middi© class hav© v©ry
diff©r©nt liv©s from wom©n of th© poor and working class©s. Racial diff©r©nc©s
roughly correspond to class diff©r©nc©s in that most black women are also poor.
Although there are also important commonalities, it is necessary to recognize
class and racial differences in any discussion of women’s relationship to the city
of Rio de Janeiro. Any failing of the city to provide services and access to
women is invariably worse for generally excluded groups such as the poor,
blacks, and migrant workers from the North and Northeast of Brazil. So any
discussion of the failures of citizenship for women in Rio de Janeiro cannot
ignore the role of class, race, sexuality, and regional identities in those failures.
Addressing the dynamics of citizenship’s failures for women incorporates
analyzing the dynamics of those failures vis-a-vis other categories of identity that
are excluded from ‘citizen’.
1. Inverting the public/private divide
a. The family in citizenship
In order to understand how citizenship intersects with the ‘private’ lives of
women, it is necessary to consider citizenship in terms of its relationship to the
family. The family acts as an important site for the articulation between women’s
daily lives and citizenship. Therefore the failings of citizenship are also
experienced in terms of the family. The family, instead of private and separate
from the political, is the site where the failures of citizenship are manifested. For
example, as neoliberal reforms and pressures from the global market lead to an
increasingly cut-back state, the family is assuming the role of the state in that the
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family has become the locus for solving social problems from access to health
care to child care and insertion into the labor market. The disillusionment with
the public role of the state has become almost entirely some kind of bad inside
joke between all the women I interviewed. On the other hand, the family is firmly
at the center of women’s lives in terms of their access to the city. The family is
the medium through which women get jobs and gain access to the limited social
services remaining (and also accommodate the lack of those services). Every
poor woman I interviewed obtained or had obtained her job through a family
connection. Given the public security crisis in Rio de Janeiro, most employers in
the service sector (especially the informal service sector) require the
recommendation of a family member before hiring. In the case of the middle
class, women rely on the social network of their parents and friends to gain
insertion into the labor market. There are a few professions that are exceptions
to this such as the military or civil service jobs that require testing.
The family is also essential to getting access to health care, education,
credit, etc. Since the state-sponsored health care and education systems are
totally bankrupt, women get access to these services mainly through family
connections. One woman in the family may work for an employer that either
provides these services or can facilitate access to them. That woman then uses
her connection to provide access to those services to the entire family. In one
case, a poor woman I interviewed was diagnosed with a malignant breast tumor.
There were no available doctors in the public health system to operate for over
two years. However her mother works as the housekeeper in the home of a
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doctor in the Zona Sul. Via her mother, she was able to schedule the surgery
with a private doctor at a reduced rate and also borrowed money from her
mother’s employer to cover the still high costs of the surgery and medications.
This is a common story—employers (particularly middle class women) from the
Zona Sul use their connections in the private health care system or the
educational system to get access for their poor employees (particularly poor
women working as housekeepers, cooks, and nurses). Because the state is
increasingly absent from the daily lives of women in Rio, the importance of the
family getting jobs, access to health care, education, etc has grown. Even in the
case of land tenure the state is absent—in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro there are
no legal property rights to land or housing. The same is true for much of the
suburbs. Residents of these communities have developed their own systems of
land tenure. The family is central even to these improvised systems of land
tenure. For example, one family that I interviewed owns a relatively large plot of
land in the suburbs. Every woman that I interviewed from the family told me the
same story regarding the land; it was an inheritance from their Portuguese
immigrant (great)grandfather and was not allowed to be sold outside the family
nor rented. Each subsequent generation would have the right to a small plot of
land to build their homes. But when I asked if there was any legal document
establishing these rules, no one could answer. The family’s idea of having the
right to the land and rules that govern that right were more important than any
sort of state-sanctioned document. In fact, no one even was aware if such a
document existed. But all three generations of women that I interviewed from
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that family were perfectly clear on the status of their land holding. They do not
trust the government to be responsible for protecting the rights to their land, and
the family becomes the site for securing property rights.
Many women also get credit through their family. Because credit of any
kind (from a mortgage to buying a car) requires a formalized job, many women
have very restricted access to credit (since more women work in the informal
sector). In the case of the middle class women that I interviewed, several women
used the name of a family member who had a formalized job to obtain credit to
buy their homes or cars. In short, access to the city’s resources and the process
of belonging to the city happens via the family—^from social life to the job market,
to owning property or obtaining credit. Because the articulation between the
state and citizenship passes through the family, the social relations in the family
have direct implications for citizenship. For example, in the face of the failures of
citizenship, the family, as a social unit, assumes the weight of those
failures—which tends to place women in a more precarious position vis-a-vis
their needs and responsibilities because women rely on the family to achieve
access to many of the city’s resources instead of formal public paths. The family
(as the private) subsidizes the workings of the state, even while the notion of
public citizenship works to maintain the private as separate from meaningful
political participation.
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b. Citizenship in violence and safety
Violence and public safety are another way that citizenship (and the failure
of substantive citizenship) intersects with women’s daily lives. Violence and the
lack of public safety functions as a failing of citizenship at the level of the private.
In Rio de Janeiro, the problems of violence and public security have reached
crisis status. The level of violence in some parts of the city, particularly the
favelas and poor neighborhoods has reached over 80 murders per 100,000
people (equivalent to the levels of violence in Colombia and South Africa) (see
figure 7) (UNDP 2001).
Figure 7; Homicide rates for Rio de Janeiro and the metropolitan area 1983-
2000
However, the violence in Rio de Janeiro, while endemic, is not homogenous—it
is, to use Holston and Appadurai’s phrase “a city-specific violence of
citizenship”(Holston and Appadurai 1999: 16). The most invasive violence is in
favelas and poor neighborhoods for Afro-brazilians (see figure 8) (UNDP 2000).
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Figure 8: Homicide rate by race and area in Rio de Janeiro
There the violence is a combination of state-sponsored raids and battles with
drug mafias (in 2001 over 900 civilians were killed by the police in Rio de
Janeiro), and wars between competing factions and mafias of the drug trade
(UNDP 2001). This violence, which had been mostly confined to the favelas and
other poor neighborhoods has recently begun to spill over into middle class
neighborhoods—with shoot-outs and ‘lightening’ kidnappings now occurring
everywhere in the city. In the Zona Sul there are 47 murders every year/100,000
people (which is a drop from the mid 1990’s when the number of murders
reached 78)(ISER 2002). The extremely high level of violence in poor
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neighborhoods due to the drug trade dramatically orders the daily lives of the
residents of those communities. It is now unsafe to use public spaces like
streets, bus stops, and plazas after dark, and increasingly during the day. It has
become increasingly dangerous for children to go to school, as the traffickers
have taken control of many local schools and resident’s associations. In the
case of one housing project where I conducted many interviews, one faction of
traffickers took control of the local school and another of the local day care and
the children where unable to attend either for over a month for fear of being
caught in the crossfire between the warring groups. Women, especially, have
had to design new ways to get their children to school, and commute to their jobs
that respect the laws of violence in their particular community. For example, the
drug traffickers or the military police deem certain times ‘off-limits’ for using public
space and local residents must work around those times or risk being shot.
Residents cannot take jobs that would entail them arriving or leaving during the
‘off-limit’ times. In middle class neighborhoods, as in poor neighborhoods, the
violence has reduced the use of public space and the areas that are available for
leisure and socializing with neighbors.
The violence in Rio de Janeiro has not been isolated to the public sphere.
Almost 60% of the incidents of serious bodily harm officially registered with the
police last year were against women. Fifty-three percent of those crimes were
committed by the woman’s husband or partner. The Instituo de Estudos da
Religiao (ISER) estimates that for every officially registered violent crime against
women, at least four go unreported (ISER 2002). ISER attributes the low rate of
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TBporting to th© lack of facilitiBS and policB trainad to daal with casBS of donriBstic
abusB. In tha cas© of on© family that I intarviawad, a sixty yaar-old woman who
had livad with har abusiv© husband for ovar thirty yaars bacaus© sh© did not
baliav© that th© polic© could protact har if sh© war© to confront har husband. Har
childran finally convincad har to mov© out of th© hous© that sh© ownad (and
sharad) har abusiv© husband, but did not faal that thay could taka th© mattar to
tha authoritias. Instaad, th© woman movad in with on© of har daughtars and th©
rast of th© family has gradually attamptad to ratriav© har balongings for har.
Anothar ©ffact of th© violanc© has baan to isolat© paopi© from thair friands
and familias who liv© in othar communitias. It is incraasingly difficult to ©ntar
communitias whar© you ar© not a rasidant, and many paopi© I intarviawad war©
afraid to go to visit thair ralativas and friands in othar araas of th© city. In terms
of conducting research, I was never able to enter a low-income community
without the company of a friend or acquaintance that lived in that community.
The drug traffickers do not permit 'strangers’ (especially with cameras and
notebooks) to enter the community. One several occasions, after I had left the
community the traffickers would go to the home of the person I had interviewed
to find out what I was doing there.
This daily terror directly affects women, who remain responsible for caring
for their children in these environments. For example, one several occasions
when I was conducting interviews in communities I witnessed groups of young
boys with pistols and semi-automatic weapons shooting at random targets in the
street during the middle of the day. They would always hide their guns behind
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their backs as I walked past, but as soon as I entered into the household where I
conducted the interviews they would begin shooting again. The level of violence
has reached a level in poor communities where children cannot play in the
streets unless they are in the pay of the traffickers and thus ‘protected’ from the
arbitrary violence. The violence directly affects the daily lives of those living in
poor communities and increasingly in middle-class areas of the city. The city
government has been unable to curtail the violence and military police share
responsibility with the traffickers in perpetuating the violence. In terms of
women’s lives, the violence is one more critical way that the state has been
unable to live up to its commitments. In middle-class areas, private security
organizations have sprouted across the city in response and is now a R$ 7.8
billion industry per year {Revista Folha do Sao Paulo 3 February 2002). In poor
neighborhoods, women have organized group trips to the schools and nurseries
for greater security.
The effect of this violence on citizenship has been dramatic (Castels and
Davidson 2000: 122). “Democratic rights are compromised by other power
circuits [including the military police, and the drug and gambling mafias] that
obliterate the public dimension of citizenship, reestablishing violence and
arbitrary power in the sphere of private relations, class, gender and ethnicity,
thereby rendering the state increasingly ineffective... ’’(Paoli and Telles 1998: 65).
Considering violence as purely public problem ignores the effects of violence at
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the level of the private. Not only the effects of violence are experienced at the
level of the private, but also responses to the public problem of violence are
articulated at the level of the private.
On the level of the ‘private,’ it is clear how citizenship is failing for women.
Because the family works as the articulation between substantive citizenship and
the state, the family is under increasing pressure to fill in the gap the state has
left—from basic security to land holding—the traditional responsibility of the
state. The failure of citizenship at the level of the family most directly affects
women because the traditional internal political and social organization of the
family means that women are usually responsible for filling the gaps in access to
the city (read household responsibilities). So citizenship, ostensibly public, relies
on the private in terms of the family and other important social networks. And the
failures of citizenship exaggerate the precariousness of this access for women.
2. Belonging to the city (having access to the city)
Another important area in which the city and national citizenship are failing
is in terms of women’s access to the resources and services of the city, both for
themselves and their families. What is most detrimental for the women I spoke
with is the lack, on a daily basis, of access to basic public services. The worst
types of discrimination are the daily indignities that wear down self-esteem and
their sense of citizenship (such as waiting in line for ten hours to get an
appointment at a public hospital). Thus formal rights like freedom of speech, and
public political participation are not sufficient to translate into substantive
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citizenship. The problem is that in Rio de Janeiro, money is the determinant for
access to the city. And economic clout and the existing social hierarchies often
speak louder than formal citizenship or rights,
a. Education, health, urban services, leisure and public space
In terms of the particular context of women’s daily lives, the public sphere
of voting and formal political participation has little impact. Instead, women most
frequently relate to the state and the city in terms of access to the city and the
services of the state for themselves and their families. The basic areas of
intersections between the state and the daily lives of women (in terms of public
education, health services, urban services, housing and land holding, and public
space and leisure) show how citizenship is failing in Rio de Janeiro. It is not
necessarily failing at the level of formalized political participation (for example,
voting is required by law). More importantly, it is failing at the level of the daily
lives and everyday struggles of women to gain access to the city.
In the case of education there has been a dramatic change in the state-
sponsored education over the past 50 years. The end of the dictatorship
coincides with a marked disintegration of the public school system. All the poor
women I interviewed identified education as the major factor limiting their access
to better jobs. In fact, a recent United Nations report on Latin America states that
“in order to have a 90% chance of not falling into poverty, it is necessary to have
ten to eleven years of schooling’’(UNECLAC 1997). The neoliberal reforms of the
Cardoso regime over the past six years have further diminished the resources
available for the public school system. Currently only a very few public schools
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in Rio de Janeiro are able to prepare students sufficiently to pass the entrance
exams into university. Instead, those who can afford the fees send their children
to private schools. As a result the bankrupt and resource-less public school
system has become ghettoized. Only the poor, who have no other option, send
their children to public school because essentially studying at a public school
(often without professors, books, or materials of any sort) forecloses any
possibility of higher education. Most private schools are financially far out of
range for a family surviving on minimum wage. The endemic violence in poor
communities also prejudices the public school system. In addition to the fact that
public schools have become spaces disputed by drug traffickers, the threat of
violence limits the possible curses of study. In one interview with a sixteen year-
old woman who lives in an extremely violent favela, her parents, although
separated, had managed to save money by cutting back in other expenses to
send her to a private school. However, while she wanted to study to become a
gynecologist, her parents forbid her because they feared that the drug traffickers
would see her returning home in white and force her to attend their wounded
(and carry out reprisals against the family if she did not help). Not only are actual
public schools overtaken by violence, but particular career choices are also
influenced.
Rio de Janeiro’s public education system has come to reflect the existing
social stratification and hierarchy. Only those with enough money to avoid the
public education system can have access to higher education. The poor, in
addition to facing schools that are unprepared to provide an education, must also
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confront violence in the public schools. Several women I interviewed have
managed on occasion to pay the private fees for a time for their children, but only
at great sacrifice (the monthly fees for the cheapest private schools including
transportation are equal to more than half the monthly minimum wage). Even for
middle-class families, the private school fees have been raising at a worrying
rate. The implications for citizenship of the collapse of the public education
system in Rio de Janeiro are several. First, the lack of access to public
education perpetuates the exclusion of poor women from higher paying jobs.
Second, the crumbling education system represents an important way that the
city is not fulfilling its commitments to its citizens. Women are forced to search
for alternative methods of acquiring an education for themselves and their
children.
Public health care and medical services is another area where the city and
the daily lives of women intersect. There is a divide between private and public
health services that mirrors the division in education, but is more extreme. The
public health care system (Sistema Unico de Saude Brasiliera), which is
supported by a heavy tax paid by employers, is bankrupt. Public hospitals do not
have the resources to provide basic care. Similar to the public education system,
the public hospitals functioned well until the end of the 1970’s and the end of the
dictatorship. And again, in parallel to the public education system, the public
health care system has deteriorated even more dramatically over the past six
years of ‘fiscal austerity’. Currently 24% of the total population in Brazil has
resorted to private health coverage, and in Rio de Janeiro the amount is much
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higher—40% of the population has been forced to sign up for private health plans
(UNDP 2001 ). Also similar to public education, the poor are forced to make due
with the crumbling public hospital network, while the middle-class purchase
private health care plans and have little or no contact with the public health care
system. For poor women, the easiest access to the public health care system is
for pre-natal care. Several women I interviewed believed that this was because
the World Bank and other international organizations use infant mortality rates
(among other indicators) to determine Brazil’s ‘level of development.’
Nonetheless, more women die during pregnancy in Brazil than in any other Latin
American country. The United Nations estimates that 200 women die in
childbirth for every 100,000 children born (UNECLAC 1997). For all other types
of health services, from family planning to hypertension, there are waits varying
from months to years for appointments. In order to be seen by a doctor in a
public hospital, the line starts to form at three in the morning to get a ticket to
enter in the waiting list for an appointment. I interviewed several women who
would cross the entire city with their children to go to a public hospital that was
rumored to have better pediatric service. Women are most likely to die from
cancer of the uterus and circulatory problems, which are “direct consequences of
bad health care’’(UNECLAC 1 997). The major complaint of the poor women that
I interviewed regarding the public health care system was not regarding the lines
or even the lack of resources—it was that at the public hospitals they felt as
though they were treated as ‘cattle’ and ‘not as a real person with dignity. The
same is clearly not true at the private hospitals in the Zona Sul of the city. In one
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interview with a poor black woman who lives in a housing project in the Zona
Norte, her former employer arranged an appointment for her in a private hospital
after she had no success getting treated for her hypertension in the public
hospital. She commented that at the private hospital she was treated ‘like a
person’ with ‘politeness and respect’, whereas as the public hospital the doctors
and nurses were ‘rude and treated her like an animal.’’'® Waiting in lines for
inadequate service in public hospitals is tiring and discouraging, and what is most
detrimental for women is the constant abasement and poor treatment that
dealing with the public health care system invokes.
Because the public health care system is so bankrupt, middle-class
women in general purchase private health care plans with varying degrees of
coverage. All the middle-class women I interviewed had helped their
housekeepers or other domestic workers get access to health care either by
loaning them money for a private consultation or arranging appointments as
favors from family doctors, etc. For poor women then, access to health care for
themselves and their family by extension is often by means of their employer.
This means not only that access to the health care system is precarious for poor
women, but that they only achieve access through their personal employment
connections working the home of another family.
In terms of family planning, the public health care system is absent. It is
difficult for poor women to have access to birth control (either in the form of the
birth control pill or condoms) because they have to purchase them from
Interview with Sebastiana Rosaria Jesus Souza on 23 January 2002.
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pharmacies for high prices. All the women I interviewed referred to their
pharmacist for advice regarding birth control and access to actual products.
Abortion is illegal in Brazil, but all the middle-class women I interviewed knew of
clinics where they could have abortions if they needed them. The going price for
an abortion in an illegal clinic is R$1000 (which is seven times the minimum
monthly wage), putting abortion firmly out of reach for poor women.
Nevertheless, the UN puts the number of clandestine abortions in Brazil per year
between 1.5 and 2 million (UNECLAC 1997). Certainly the high number of
clandestine abortions contributes to the high death rate of women during
pregnancy.
Perhaps one of the best indicators of the status of the public health care
system has been the dengue epidemic that has worsened each summer in Rio
de Janeiro.^^ The government estimates that for every infected person treated at
a hospital or clinic, four receive no treatment and are not officially registered.
The government estimates that between December 2001 and March 2002 over
one million people in the greater metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro have been
infected with dengue. The city government argued about funds with the federal
Ministry of Health, which led to gridlock and complete inaction by the city
government from December 2001 to February 2002. Meanwhile, the burden on
the already overtaxed public health system grew exponentially. During February
" Dengue is a mosquito-transmitted virus similar to yellow fever. It is fatal in rare but increasing
cases. There is no vaccine, but controlling the mosquito population controls the disease. For
example, the state of Florida (which is relatively similar to the state of Rio de Janeiro in size and
populations) kept the number of dengue cases to eleven last year. For the past ten years,
dengue has been a problem every summer in Rio de Janeiro. However during summer of 2001-
2002 the disease reached epidemic proportions with over one million people infected.
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2002 thsre were waits of over eight hours at public and private hospitals for the
blood exam for dengue. The public health care system, like the city government,
was totally unprepared to deal with dengue, much less an epidemic.
The health care system in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates another area of
women’s daily lives where the city is unable to provide access to much needed
services. On balance, it is those with money who are able to purchase better
access to health services, although in times of crisis not even the private health
care system can cope with the need.
Another critical intersection between the city and women’s every day lives
are urban services—electricity, running water and sewage systems, telephone
lines, street and sidewalk paving, mail delivery, public illumination, garbage
collection, etc. The provision of urban services follows the marked spatial
divisions in the city. In the Zona Sul, the services are generally good and no one
I interviewed reported having difficulty getting access to any urban service. In
the Zona Norte the provision of urban services is considerably poorer, and in
favelas and the city’s suburbs, urban services are virtually non-existent.^^ For
regions of the city that do not benefit from urban services, the communities have
organized to obtain them independently—i.e. illegally tapping into electricity and
sewage lines, dumping garbage into rivers and canals, rigging illegal street
lamps, etc.
An interesting exception to this spatial division in the provision of urban services is the suburb
of Nilopolis. Urban services in Nilopolis are as good as urban services in the Zona Sul of Rio de
Janeiro because the region’s samba school (Beija-Flor) has financed the provision of urban
services in the municipality. The samba school has financed a broad range of urban services in
addition to day cares, schools, and a university for Nilopolis.
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In terms of women s daily lives the presence or absence of urban services
has a huge impact. If there are no urban services or if it is difficult to obtain
them, then the family will need to spend considerable amounts of time, effort, and
money in order to get them. As a drastic example, in several favelas there is still
not running water. Women spend several hours out of every day waiting at the
communal well to fill buckets with water and carry them back home. While this is
not the case in most favelas or poor neighborhoods, the pattern regarding urban
service is the same. Women are usually responsible for filling in for the absence
in urban services. In the case of one family from the suburbs, the family joined
with others on their street to install their own water pump because the municipal
water system is very unreliable. When there was no water, the women from the
families on that street would either ‘borrow’ water from a neighbor in an
unaffected region, or purchase it in large jugs. The lack of urban services is a
major area of intersection between the city and the every day lives of women.
That urban services are not equal everywhere in Rio de Janeiro is more than
obvious. In coping with these absences, poor women are confronted with the
failure of the city to provide basic services to their particular communities.
Leisure and particularly the use of public space for leisure is another area
of intersection between the city and the daily lives of women. Like education,
health care, urban services, and housing, access to leisure and public spaces
reflects at least partly the spatial divides in Rio de Janeiro. The Zona Norte and
suburbs have very few parks or other green spaces and no clean beaches. The
Zona Sul has both numerous beaches and parks. Most city-sponsored
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recreational events take place in the Zona Sul, because there is literally no space
for them in the Zona Norte or suburbs. A class divide matches the spatial divide
in access to leisure. Most of the city-sponsored leisure and recreation activities
are clearly designed for the middle class, either because they are expensive or
because they are scheduled at night when it is no longer safe for residents of
poor neighborhoods to use public transportation. Even the symbols of life in the
Zona Sul are inaccessible to people from the Zona Norte because they are too
expensive or inaccessible by public transportation: Corcovado (the statue of
Christ), Sugar Loaf Mountain, restaurants, some beaches. These are supposed
to be public areas, but in fact they are open to a very specific person. In one
interview, a woman from the suburbs explained that “whenever too many people
from the [suburbs] come to events in the Zona Sul, the people from the Zona Sul
stay away.”^^ Leisure for middle class women in Rio de Janeiro centers around
the various beaches, lagoons, plazas, and parks in the Zona Sul. The city also
shuts down all the roads in the Zona Sul that run along the beaches during
weekends and holidays to create more leisure space. So leisure for residents of
the Zona Sul is strongly tied to public recreational space. In the middle class,
leisure is more evenly distributed between women and men. In general, the
middle class has a lot more time for leisure (especially the women), because they
do not have the household responsibilities of the working class.
Leisure is very different for women in the working class—it is almost always
linked to the family or the church, such as making dinners and having birthday
Interview with Sonia Castro Rodriguez on 18 December 2001.
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parties for family members, etc. Men, on the other hand, are more free to go to
the corner bar and drink and gamble with their friends. Most of the poor women I
interviewed felt that they had little or no leisure time and that the city did not
provide the opportunity for leisure. They did not feel comfortable or could not
afford to go to the beaches in the Zona Sul. The parks of the Zona Sul are not
easily accessible by public transportation. And the beaches, which are easily
accessible by public transportation, are only practical on Saturdays, since the
subway system and trains do not run on Sundays. “Maids don’t go to work on
Sundays and people from the Zona Sul don’t want the beaches full of poor
people,” one woman explained.^'^ In poor communities, the public safety crisis
has exacerbated the lack of space for leisure since the local plazas and corners
are now controlled by drug traffickers who use this space to conduct their sales.
One women from a poor suburb explained that when her son goes out on the
weekends to dance samba at the local samba school, she gives him the exact
change he needs for the bus and some beers. And then she gives him a
separate amount she calls “the thiefs money”. She is worried that if he is robbed
and does not have enough money to appease the thief, he will be killed. He
keeps the money hidden in case he is attacked and is not allowed to spend the
thiefs money on anything else.''® Leisure, particularly in public spaces, is
increasingly restricted for both poor women and women from the middle-class.
While women from the middle-class still have access to more leisure and public
space than poor women, the city is not guaranteeing access to either.
Intervisw with Ruth Pio Raposo Grisantos on 24 January 2002.
Interview with Sandra da Costa Rodriguez Faria on 8 March 2002.
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So citizenship in terms of lack of access to the city’s resources is failing
across a range of public services including education, health care, leisure and
public space, and urban services. In terms of women’s daily lives, it is the
access to these resources that is important and the collapse of the education and
health care systems and the lack of urban services and access to public space
and leisure translate into failures in citizenship,
b. Job market
Another failure of citizenship in terms of access to the city’s resources is
women’s access to the job market. Access to the job market, both in terms of
access to the market as a whole and in terms of access to different sectors of job
market, is a critical area of intersection between women’s lives and their
citizenship in the city because lack of access to the job market means the failure
of meaningful citizenship. In the labor market, “gender is still the main factor of
differentiation; women have a lower average occupational status and income
than men’’(Castels and Davidson 2000; 122). Women in Brazil earn 30% less
doing the same jobs as men, and the higher the level of education, the worse the
divide. Men with 17 years or more of education earn 99% more than women with
the same amount of education in the same jobs {Journal do Brasil 8 March 2002
19). Women in Rio face two major problems in terms of the job market. The first
is the narrow range of jobs available and the second is achieving access to what
jobs are available. There are several factors that limit the range of jobs available
to women. First, it is important to note that access to the labor market for women
(especially middle class women) has expanded considerably since World War II,
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as it has in most Western countries. The main limiting factor for poor women in
terms of access to the job market is education, while for middle class women,
globalization and neoliberal reforms most directly limit their access. The range of
jobs available to poor women remains extremely limited. Poor women can
choose between service jobs, such has housekeeping, cooking, child care,
usually all in the homes of richer families, and other unskilled service industry
jobs, such as shop clerk, telephone receptionist, or street vendor (UNECLAC
1997). The majority of these jobs are in the informal sector (at least 40% of jobs
in Rio de Janeiro are in the informal sector), which means that women are not
protected by labor laws (UNDP 2000). These jobs, which are currently viable for
young poor women, are essentially the same jobs that were available to their
mothers and grandmothers. While the middle class, primarily because of access
to education, enjoys a greater selection of possible professions, all the women I
interviewed felt that they experienced restricted access to the job market. For
women from the middle class “it is simply not easy to shift between different
types of jobs, and there are not many jobs available, so you must choose a
career that has strong possibilities for employment.”^® What are the implications
of these restrictions in women’s lives? For poor women, the very narrow range
of jobs available means that they almost always have to travel long distances to
have access to jobs. If they choose to work in the service industry in someone’s
home, they will have to travel to the parts of the city with upscale neighborhoods.
Where as poor men can often opt for jobs closer to home, such as work as a
Interview with Mariana Bernardes Grisantos on 21 January 2002.
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mechanic, in civil construction, and unskilled factory work, poor women need to
travel increasingly long distances to access the jobs available to them. The
expense, in time and money, of that travel means less resources for their own
families. For middle class women, the growing pressures of a globalizing job
market are counteracting the historical expansion of possible careers for women.
A broad range of jobs that used to be viable financially are paying increasingly
less, such as teaching, social work, nursing, design, journalism, etc. Meanwhile,
other sectors, such as finance and information technology offer higher wages but
employ fewer women. The youngest generation of women faces a more
restricted job market than their parents and increasingly pursues options outside
of Brazil.
The second major factor influencing women’s access to the job market is
the process of securing a job. All the women I interviewed claimed that the
primary way they find employment is through the recommendation of a friend or
family member. With the exception of jobs in the military or entry-level civil
service jobs, women invariably learn about job prospects and succeed in finding
a job because someone they know gives them the information and recommends
them to the employer. For poor women, this means that their access to jobs in
the Zona Sul in rich households requires personal connections to women in the
Zona Sul. Most often, this connection is made through other women in their
family who also work as domestic servants. For middle class women, social
contacts and professional contacts are the means for getting access to the job
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market (see Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). Pressures from globalization have done
little to erode the connection between access to the job market and social and
family networks.
So for women in Rio de Janeiro, the types of jobs available are limited by
their degree of access to education, and by the pressures of neoliberal reforms
and globalization under the Cardoso regime. And access to that limited range of
jobs is dependent upon the family and social network. What are the implications
of this situation for citizenship? First, access to jobs and the job market is mainly
influenced by factors from the private sphere—access to education, and the
knowledge of friends and family. The neoliberal model of a flexibilized labor
forces competing in a global market is very distant from the context of women in
Rio de Janeiro. Ironically, one of the central conditions of democratic
citizenship—the citizen as worker/consumer—relies not on the public sphere, but
on the private. The public sphere, in terms of the Cardoso administration, the
city government, and international financial institutions, remains distant in terms
of improving women’s access to the job market. In order to fulfill the public
requirement of participation in the economy of the city as a worker and a
consumer, women must rely on their own private connections,
c. Housing
Access to adequate housing and regularized property rights is a major
issue in Rio de Janeiro. In terms of citizenship, the degree of access to
adequate housing and regularized property rights is an important articulation
between the state and citizenship in women’s daily lives. Lack of access to
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adequate housing directly diminishes the degree of citizenship and access to the
city s resources as a whole. In particular, access to adequate housing and/or
regularized property rights is a major division in access to the city and so
represents a major failing in citizenship.
Specifically, access (or the lack thereof) to housing represents a second
important spatial division in Rio de Janeiro: legal versus slum tenancy. Nearly
one-third of Rio’s population lives in slums (illegal land occupations) and over
half the city’s population lives in quasi-legal or illegal tenancy situations. The
lack of adequate housing has been a problem in the city since the late 1890’s
when the government evicted over one thousand people from a tenement
building (called Cabega do Porco or the Pig’s Head) in the dock area of the city.
The then-homeless residents of the former tenement built the first favela (or
illegal land occupation) with the demolished remains of their tenement building.
Since then, the number of favelas in the city has grown to over one hundred,
spread throughout the entire city, but concentrated in the North and West Zones.
Without legal regularized property rights, the homes of a large portion of the city’s
residents are insecure. In Rio de Janeiro, the spatial difference between living in
legalized housing and illegal or quasi-legal housing has direct implications for the
level of access to the city’s resources. Without legal property rights, it is difficult
to find regular work, get credit, or have access to urban services. In addition,
living in a squatter settlement also means less access to the city as whole
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because the public transportation system heavily favors the Zona Sul. Those who
live in favelas, the suburbs, or various parts of the Zona Norte have considerably
less citizenship in Rio than those who live in the Zona Sul.
For example, “Maria”, a mother of one and a housekeeper, cannot afford
to live in the Zona Sul. She lives in a relatively nice house with normalized
property rights in the suburbs of the city that she and her husband built together
over a period of five years. It takes her three hours and three buses to get her
housekeeping jobs in the Zona Sul. She spends six hours in transit every day
she works. She represents a large population of working poor that are
continually moving further and further from the job markets because of real
estate prices and discrimination in the real estate market. She has opted to live
so far from the center because there she can afford to own her own home. Often
favelas are closer to the job markets and resources of the Zona Sul, but access
to other urban services and public safety is more precarious in favelas.
Nevertheless, in the suburbs where Maria lives, the wait for a telephone is four
years (as compared with 3 days in the Zona Sul.) She gets the family’s water
from a well rather than the municipal water system because the municipal water
system is very precarious and often there are water cuts lasting several days.
There is one public extremely rudimentary medical clinic where she lives, and
only one school. In practical terms, where she lives reduces her citizenship in
the city. She is able to participate in the city on very limited conditions because
of where she lives. She looses a degree of citizenship by living in a suburb, just
as residents of the favelas lose degrees of citizenship by living in a slum.
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Adequate access to legal housing is a major failure of citizenship in Rio de
Janeiro. Because there is such a housing shortage many of Rio de Janeiro’s
residents live in precarious situations, which impedes their access to other city
resources. In addition, living in illegal and precarious housing is a source of
social discrimination—in the job market (it is difficult to get certain jobs with an
address in a favela), in terms of public safety (police and criminal violence affects
poor communities and squatter settlements more than rich areas of the city), etc.
Lack of access to the city’s resources, from urban services, to the job
market and adequate housing, is a major failing of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro.
It is the lack of access to the city’s resources, on a daily basis, that shows how
citizenship fails in respect to the quotidian of women’s lives. In the face of
inadequate urban services, jobs and housing, women draw on their private
resources, such as family and professional connections, to fill the gap in their
substantive citizenship. If the slippages of substantive citizenship are
experienced at the level of lack of access to the city’s resources, then women
have responded to these failures in citizenship by drawing on their personal
resources—and so citizenship as public political participation is further vacated of
meaning. Public political participation and the formal rights of citizenship do not
address these failings at the intersection between women’s daily lives and the
state in the city.
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3. The casting of citizens
Part of the failure of national citizenship, I have argued, is due to way that
national citizenship has been defined as universal, while in reality it privileges the
interests of certain groups and excludes others. Similarly national citizenship has
failed because it evokes a certain kind of citizen, and the role of citizen as set out
in national citizenship conflicts with other kinds of roles and responsibilities. For
the women I interviewed in this study, the role of citizen as defined by
participation in the public political sphere conflicts with other roles like that of
mother and consumer. The tension between these different roles demonstrates
how the particular role of citizen, which claims to be universal, works to erase
certain other roles and identities. That the notion of citizen is powerful is
clear—and neoliberal reformers and social activists alike attempt to appropriate
and reshape the notion of citizen along the lines of particular interests. In the
case of women in Rio de Janeiro, there are several important ways that the role
of the citizen has been contested and deployed according to particular interests.
Neoliberalism attempts to recast the role of citizen in terms of the market. Also,
the terms of both public political participation and cultural participation in the city
evoke a particular ‘citizen’ that corresponds to the divisions of power in the city.
So the meaning of ‘citizen’ and the discourse of citizenship function to exclude
certain groups and identities while privileging others.
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a. The neoliberal project: market citizen versus mother
The wave of neoliberal reforms throughout Latin America and particularly
in Brazil has had an important influence on citizenship. These reforms have
encouraged a re-casting of the meaning of citizen around the fulfillment of certain
responsibilities (i.e. participation in the market), and an increasing
‘individualization’ of citizenship and rights (see Hayek 1944, O’Dougherty 1999,
and Schild 1999). "Citizens, in [the neoliberal] view, should pull themselves up
by their own private bootstraps, and citizenship is increasingly equated with
individual integration into the market’’(Alvarez et. al. 1 998; 1 ). Yet Fernando
Henrique Cardoso’s neoliberal administration was rated the worst in Brazilian
history in terms of major economic indicators including the divide between rich
and poor (Journal do Brasil 8 March 2002: 18). How exactly have neoliberal
reforms attempted to re-shape citizenship and the role of citizen? First, the
conservative and neoliberal position particularly taxes the family structure,
because as the state withdrawals from social services, the family and social
networks must fill in the gap (if possible) at a time when even less resources are
available for those needs. The situation for women is particularly difficult
because neoliberalism expects everyone to be a ‘market citizen’ and participate
in remunerated work in the market economy (Bulbeck 1999; 99). In fact, it is
probably necessary for the family’s survival that both men and women work
outside the home in order to survive. In poor families, women’s contributions
make up 38% of the family’s income (UNECLAC 1997). But there is no change
in the distribution of household responsibilities—women are still responsible for
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childcare, cleaning, shopping, and in many cases, securing education and health
care for the family. Of course this problem is exacerbated in the case of single-
mother household, which are dramatically on the rise in Brazil and Rio de
Janeiro. Single mothers now head one in four households in Brazil (up from one
in six in 1991) and earn an average US$ 246 per month in comparison to men's
US$ 344 per month (see figures 9a and b) {Journal do Brasil 8 March 2002: 18).
Figure 9a: Single-mother headed households in Brazil 1991
1991
single-
mother
headed
households
16%
other
households
84%
single-mother headed households Bother households
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Figure 9b: Single-mother headed household in Brazil 1991
2002
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This dilemma—between acting as a market citizen and acting as the mother of a
household—clashes with the traditional conservative view of the role of women
as mother and wife. Women invent new strategies to secure access to essential
services. For example, one woman I interviewed from the extremely poor
suburbs pays for her son to attend private school whenever she can scrape
together enough money for that term in order to keep her son out of the
practically non-functional local public school. When she doesn’t have the money
for the fees, her son returns to the public school until she can accumulate
enough to pay the private school fees again. In another case, a middle class
woman pays for private health insurance for her long-time housekeeper because
the public health services have become impossibly decrepit. She pays the
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private health care fees for her housekeeper instead of paying the health care tax
to the government. The effect of these strategies to be both market citizen and
mother is that women are often in increasingly precarious positions. In practice,
different women face a very different integration of family responsibilities and the
labor market. For middle class women, the household work is done by a maid,
from childcare, to cooking, cleaning and laundry. The very definition of
‘mothering’ is different. For the poor and working class, the family takes care of
the children and they divide other household work amongst the family—someone
washes the clothes, the older generation takes care of the children, etc. This
means that the demands of market citizen and mother are even more
contradictory for poor women. For the working class women, there is much less
time for leisure. Participation in the public sphere is reduced to work for survival
and earning enough to make ends meet. Entry into the job market at an early
age is necessary financially, but women must still negotiate their household
responsibilities—^for poor women this often forecloses the possibility of higher
education. In one interview, a poor black mother of two (who is also currently
raising her granddaughter) said that once she had children, further education
was out of the question for her: “With children, there is no time for education
even though I wanted it. Who would take care of the children?”''^ The role of
market citizen is further excluding women, especially poor women, from
meaningful public participation in their city. In practice the doubled burden of
household responsibilities at a time when increasingly less social services are
From interview with Sebastiana (Tiana) Rosaria Jesus Soren on 23 January 2002.
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available from the state, plus the responsibility/need to participate in the market
serves to further alienate women from formal political participation because the
state is failing at the level of women’s daily lives,
b. Political participation
The terms of political participation are another important way that the role
of citizen is determined. There have been major shits in the nature of formal
citizenship in Brazil over the past fifty years—from dictatorship to democracy.
Increasingly the notion of public political participation has become bankrupt,
because formal participation has not produced meaningful results in terms of
reducing the social inequalities of Rio de Janeiro. The arrival of democracy and
democratic citizenship with its list of rights has had little impact at the quotidian
level of women’s lives.
The problem, as far as political participation is concerned, is that in Rio de
Janeiro, the state is present in the wrong places, and in the most threatening
ways—and absent from the right places where it should be addressing social
problems. The state is present in the military police that routinely extort money at
roadblocks, kidnap family members of suspected criminals, and indiscriminately
shoot low-income residents while ‘cracking down’ on violence. The state is
present in corruption scandals—parliamentary, judicial, and executive. The state
is present in incompetence—failing to invest in the energy system causing rolling
blackouts and months of energy rationing, failing to implement public health
protections leading to a dengue epidemic. Yet in the places where the state
should intervene to address social problems—it remains absent. Public schools
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are a completely incapable of preparing students for higher education—there are
no teachers, no materials—schools are overrun by drug traffickers. The public
health care system is even worse, with yearlong waiting periods for treatment for
basic health problems like high blood pressure. The poor are forced to wait in
line starting at three in the morning to get an appointment for months later. The
housing shortage in Rio pushes more and more people into illegal housing and
squatter settlements—currently one third of the city’s population lives in favelas
and the state cannot (some say will not) alleviate the problem. The declaration of
the presence of political and economic rights is supposed to be a key step in
moving towards democracy, but it has had little to no effect on the daily lives of
Rio de Janeiro’s citizens. These failings mean that the very notion of the public
sphere has become bankrupt. Not only does the state not fulfill its
responsibilities, but it aggravates social problems. Given this bleak picture of
formal state action and insertion into the city, why should Rio de Janeiro’s
citizens continue to believe that political participation in the public sphere has any
value?
For most of the women I spoke with, the notion of public citizenship is
bankrupt because the state is corrupt and does not permit meaningful public
participation. They believe that the ostensibly democratic government of Rio de
Janeiro is a fagade. And so citizenship is only applicable in terms of their daily
lives, at the level of the private, which is precisely where democratic citizenship
says that citizenship is not relevant. If women are only experiencing citizenship
(and its failures) on the level of the private, then the idea of public citizenship
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becomes ridiculous and the sense of alienation and disgust with the political
system only grows worse. In the face of the absence of any meaningful pubic
participation, women (and especially poor and black women) have little or no
faith in democracy. One poor black woman, who lives in a city housing project,
said that “Brazil would be better off with a dictatorship. At least then things were
working.” In another interview with a poor elderly woman from the suburbs, I
asked if she noted any major difference in her life between the dictatorship and
now with democracy. She replied that there are more buses now. This
sentiment is echoed in the middle class. In a plebiscite held in 1993 mandated
by the Constitution established in 1988 at the end of the dictatorship, Brazilians
voted to choose a form of government. Only 66% voted to maintain democracy
(either as presidential or parliamentary) while 11% voted for a monarchy and an
additional 33% voted for “other form of government” (http://conhecimentosgerais.
hypermart.net.) Several women that I interviewed voted against democracy for
Brazil. One woman explained that she voted for the monarchy because she did
not believe that the form of government would make any difference in her life and
i 8
“a king or queen sounds more interesting than a president.”
Political participation, because it does not address the social injustices
women regularly face, has been rendered practically useless. In Rio de Janeiro,
the state tends to be present in the wrong places (in terms of police violence and
political corruption) and absent in the right ones (in terms of providing meaningful
social services). Women experience these failures of citizenship in terms of
Interview with Mariana Bernardes on 21 January 2002.
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exclusion from the resources of the city as much as the futility of public political
participation. Public political participation serves to erase women’s problems
because political participation in the public sphere does not address the
problems women experience at the level of the private—so the notion of
citizenship through that kind of political participation becomes bankrupt,
c. Cultural participation
Especially because of the bankruptcy of political participation as a citizen
in Rio de Janeiro, cultural participation is an important medium for defining the
role of citizen. In the history of Brazilian nationalism, cultural participation of
typically marginalized groups has always been considered ‘safer’ than political
participation (Davis 1999). Alvarez et. al. argue that through cultural participation
social movements are changing political configurations and re-defining
democracy and citizenship (Alvarez et. al. 1998). But cultural participation also
intersects with citizenship on the quotidian level, where modes of participation
and spaces for participation continue to reflect social and political hierarchies.
In Brazil, the cultural productions of excluded groups (Afro-Brazilians, the urban
poor, etc.) has been publicly celebrated and usually appropriated by the middle
class and dominant national discourse. This pattern has been repeated from
samba to baile funk, to Carnaval and Revillon, to capoiera and ‘black music’ (see
Machado 1980 and Davis 1999). However, this pattern of cultural appropriation
has not anesthetized the space of cultural participation for the excluded from new
developments and modes of participation.
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Perhaps the best example of this is Carnaval. Carnaval is a national
festival in Brazil, with very different local variations. In Rio de Janeiro, there are
both relatively informal street parades throughout the city, and highly organized
samba ‘schools’ that organize extremely elaborate parades through a ‘samba’
stadium. While all the samba schools originate in favelas and poor
neighborhoods, the schools’ parades are financed by the participation of rich and
middle class cariocas, and covert underwriting by the gambling and drug mafias.
The city government also subsidizes the schools. In recent years, major
corporations have also financed particular schools. Despite this odd combination
of resources, the samba parades continue to address issues of social justice and
exclusion (in addition to celebrating Brazilian national identity and icons). All the
poor women that 1 interviewed expressed a strong emotional connection to
Carnaval, with the exception of evangelicos or Christian fundamentalists.
Carnaval and other forms of cultural expression do challenge the social injustices
of the city, but only in a non-threatening deliberately non-political way. One poor
woman I interviewed said that she loved Carnaval because it was the one time of
the year when the city forgot to discriminate against the poor—but that the
problem is that it always remembers to discriminate again when Carnaval ends.^®
While some forms of carioca (from Rio de Janeiro) culture challenge social
exclusion, these challenges are mitigated as forms of cultural participation are
incorporated into the mainstream. Cultural participation tends to reinforce the
existing social hierarchies. In terms of the women that I interviewed, there was a
Interview with Sandra da Costa Rodriguez Faria on 8 March 2002.
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marked difference between the ways that poor women and middle-class women
viewed their cultural participation. Poor women, in general, felt excluded from
the traditional cultural events of the Zona Sul, such as concerts, shows,
museums, and landmarks. Their primary medium for cultural participation is
Carnaval. Although Carnaval itself only lasts a few days, events and
preparations for Carnaval happen almost year-round. Since samba schools are
based in favelas and poor communities, participation in Carnaval is comfortable
for poor women. For middle class women, cultural participation is attending
exactly the concerts, shows, and museums that the poor feel excluded from.
Unlike poor women, the middle class women I interviewed were not particularly
comfortable with or attracted to Carnaval (although all confessed to watching
Carnaval on television and following the results). So in limited circumstances,
cultural participation can serve to reduce social hierarchies, but in general
cultural participation in Rio de Janeiro reinforces those hierarchies. Furthermore,
the on-going appropriation of new forms of culture by the mainstream tends to
mitigate the challenges that cultural expression makes against political and social
exclusion.
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CHAPTER III
RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP
“People in Rio de Janeiro wear fantasias (Carnaval costumes) in their minds. They
disguise who they are—and forget that no one is better than anyone else.”
—Sandra da Costa Rodriguez Faria in interview on 8 March 2002
This analysis of national citizenship, contextualized in the city of Rio de
Janeiro from the perspective of women’s daily lives, invites a recasting of
citizenship. National citizenship is an insufficient concept to address the multiple
levels and meanings of citizenship that this research has highlighted. This
research demonstrates that, citizenship, like political community, has multiple
referents and multiple meanings. For the women in this study, the forms of
citizenship that they have articulated on a daily basis in reference to their families
and interpersonal networks is their most important citizenship (perhaps because
national citizenship has so little meaning for them). The city embodies
contrasting citizenships—not just because citizenship is unequal, but also
because different groups are recasting citizenship with new meanings. These
examples demonstrate how different levels and meanings of citizenship can
overlap with this ‘privatized’ citizenship. Valid but different citizenships also exist
in relationship to other kinds of political communities. For example, the global
movement for some form of human rights often refers to the idea of a global
citizen. Citizenship on a global level cannot serve the same purpose as national
citizenship because the global political community is not the same as the national
political community. Global citizenship serves to address certain broad issues,
often overlooked and violated by states. However global citizenship does not
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preclude national citizenship, just as city citizenship does not preclude national
citizenship. Certainly these different types of citizenship can and do
conflict citizenship in terms of the city is not always commensurate with national
citizenship, etc. However, if political authority has become increasingly
dispersed then expanding meanings and levels of citizenships follow. This
analysis of citizenship in terms of women’s lives in Rio de Janeiro suggests that
different levels and meanings of citizenship are possible—and from the starting
point of the failures of national citizenship, breaks down the notion of a unified
and solitary citizenship in the nation-state.
How have the spaces where citizenship has been failing the women in this
study also been the spaces where citizenship has been recast and rearticulated?
First, this research has shown how ostensibly public national citizenship has
actually relied heavily on the resources of the so-called private for viability. That
is, women employ their interpersonal connections to fulfill the stated
responsibilities of the state when the state does not fulfill its commitments. In so
doing, citizenship is recast at the level of the family and interpersonal
relationships. For the women in this study, the most important political
community in concrete terms was not the nation-state—it was their own particular
community. For them, the ‘private’ is the most important source of political
community because it is in that community that they address their access to the
society’s resources. And it is also in that community where belonging to a
political community and by extension, citizenship, has meaning.
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Second, women articulated their citizenship in terms of access to the city’s
spatial, social, cultural, economic, and political resources. This access to the city
(or lack thereof) relates directly to the women in this study achieving belonging in
the political community of the city. As women articulated differently the
processes of gaining access to the city’s resources they achieved particular
levels of belonging in the political community. Women in this study experienced
exclusion from national citizenship in specific ways in their daily lives. And in
response, they devised different strategies of responding to these exclusions that
provided access to the city’s resources to a limited degree. So the failures of
national citizenship, in substantive terms, make the particular context (in this
case the city) more important in terms of determining citizenship’s political
community. The women in this study are not activists nor are they involved in
social movements. In response to the failings of national citizenship, they
contest access to the society’s resources and belonging in a political community
at the level of their city, which has the most relevance to their daily lives. This
process of contesting access and achieving belonging makes the city, in their
case, the most important political community in concrete terms.
Finally, this research shows how the role of citizen has been employed to
advance particular interests and exclude other roles. Traditional citizenship and
the role of citizen through certain forms of political, economic, and cultural
participation, foreclose opportunities for certain people, while privileging others.
However this research shows how the role of citizen can be recast to
accommodate other conflicting roles such as that of mother—and how different
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forms of political and cultural participation can also change the terms of
citizenship. While the role of citizen can foreclose certain possibilities; it can
also be recast to open others. In recasting the role of citizen in relationship to
their own interests and roles, the women in this study are imparting new meaning
to citizenship—in their own terms.
How did the women in this study recast the meaning of citizenship and
citizen in order to reinvigorate the notion of citizenship in terms of their own lives?
They defined citizenship in their daily lives in three ways; 1 ) to be treated with
dignity in public places, such as shops, hospitals, public transportation, and at
home; 2) to feel part of the city; and 3) to have meaningful participation in the
city’s development such that the development addresses the social injustices and
development ‘works for all the people’. The main criteria, then, for the re-casting
of citizenship in terms of the quotidian is that citizenship must result in a sense of
dignity and belonging for all the members of the political community. Meaningful
citizenship cannot exist without dignity. The failures of national citizenship have
led to a lack of dignity and a poverty of meaning in citizenship. Women and
others do not necessarily lose their dignity just because they are poor or do not
have certain rights. Rather, it is the sum of daily interactions and experiences,
conflicts and triumphs that mean the difference between dignity and exclusion.
In terms of the people that I interviewed in Rio de Janeiro, the daily discrimination
and lack of dignity that people experience in shops, clinics, buses, etc. is the
main barrier to substantive citizenship.
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As Hannah Arendt argues: “The fundamental deprivation of human rights
[and citizenship] is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in
the world [a political space] which makes opinions significant, and actions
effective....We became aware of the right to have rights...and a right to belong to
some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who
had lost and could not regain those rights....(Arendt in Jelin 1998: 405).
In light of the failures of national citizenship, and this re-examination of
citizenship for women in Rio de Janeiro—what are the ways that citizenship can
respond to its failures? First, if citizenship is to bridge the gap between formal
and substantive participation in society, it must be redefined in broader terms that
break from the traditional liberal tenets of the nation-state. An expanded and
broader definition of citizenship and political participation allows politics to
address citizenship's failings at a different level from political parties and other
formal political institutions. Specifically, citizenship must respond to the ways
that political exclusion affects people’s daily lives, in terms of access to the
resources of the society. Citizenship must be also be redefined in terms of a
process of belonging that occurs in reference to multiple layers of political
communities and meanings.
Dagnino argues that to “assert the notion of citizenship as a political
strategy (Wiener 1992) means to emphasize its character as a historical
construct that expresses concrete interests and practices not previously defined
by a given universal essence. In this sense, the contents and meanings [of
citizenship] are not previously defined and limited but constitute a response to
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the dynamics of real conflicts and the political struggle lived by particular society
at a given historical moment”(Dagnino 1998: 50). This study has shown that, in
addition to social movements, the every day experiences of a particular group in
a particular context can also contest the “contents and meanings" of citizenship.
In fact, understanding citizenship at the level of the family in women’s lives in Rio
de Janeiro is as radical in terms of political ramifications as understanding
citizenship in terms of social movements. This study has shown that spaces
where citizenship is failing are also spaces where citizenship is recast: public
citizenship relies on the private, rights are little without the means for meaningful
participation and access to the society’s resources, and the role of ‘citizen’ can
work to erase certain identities or to protect the dignity of others.
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APPENDIX
CITIZENSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE
Length of interview:
Demographic Information
Date:
Name:
Age: Sex: Race:
Occupation/employment:
Spouse’s occupation:
Region/Place of birth:
Current address:
Highest level of education/age completed:
Number/ages of children:
I. Citizenship in the family
Describe your (education/access to health care/access to urban services/access
to housing) in terms of yourself and your family.
How are the household responsibilities (child care, cleaning, etc.) divided in your
house? Is the division the same when you are working?
In your daily life, what personal relationships are most important? How?
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II. Citizenship in the city
Where in the metropolitan area do you a) travel b) work c) go shopping d) spend
your leisure time? Are there any places in the city that never go (or cannot go)?
What do you think is the most important way that you participate in the city?
How do you participate politically?
Has your political participation been different during different governments?
Do you think that the government works for you? How?
Do you feel like a citizen of the city of Rio de Janeiro?
If you had more access to the city, would that change your level of citizenship?
How?
Do you think that the city treats everyone equally?
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III. Economic citizenship
How do you normally find a job?
How do others in your family find jobs?
What jobs do you have access to?
Are there jobs that you would like to have, but don’t have access? If so, why
don’t you have access?
When you are not working, do you feel more or less part of society?
IV. Cultural and social citizenship
Do you think citizenship is different for the rich and the poor? How?
Do you think citizenship is different for men and women? How?
Do you think citizenship is different for people of different races? How?
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What cultural aspects of the city are most important to you (for example Camaval
or other festivals, a type of music, the beaches, government-sponsored shows,
etc.)?
Do you have access to all cultural aspects of the city? Do you feel included in
them?
How would you define citizenship in Rio de Janeiro in terms of you own daily life?
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